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Article

Prospective Grandfathering: Anticipating
the Energy Transition Problem
Christopher Serkin † & Michael P. Vandenbergh ††
INTRODUCTION
Legal change poses familiar but difficult problems for the
legal system.1 New regulatory regimes can disrupt settled expectations and property rights. 2 The Takings Clause seeks to temper the most extreme costs of such legal change, and in the process can constrain governments’ ability and willingness to adopt
new laws and regulations. 3 Even unsuccessful takings claims—
or the threat of takings claims—can exert significant political
pressure, to the extent they implicate commitments to fairness
and freedom from government intrusion and reflect legitimateseeming grievances by property owners. 4

† Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Vanderbilt University Law School.
†† David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair of Law, Director, Climate
Change Research Network, and Co-Director, Energy, Environment and Land
Use Program, Vanderbilt University Law School. Thanks to Daniel Raimi for
insights on energy data, and to Jim Rossi and Greg Stein for comments on an
earlier draft. Thanks also to participants at faculty workshops at Vanderbilt
Law School and the University of Maryland School of Law, at the 2017 Property
Conference at Texas A&M, at the Progressive Property Conference at Loyola
New Orleans, and at the Private Law Workshop at the University of Tel Aviv
hosted by Hanoch Dagan and Roy Kreitner. Thanks especially to Rob Abrams,
Emily Burns, Turner Henderson, Emmett McKinney, and Kacy Murphree for
excellent research assistance. Copyright © 2018 by Christopher Serkin & Michael P. Vandenbergh.
1. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 509, 517 (1986); see also infra note 191 (citing and discussing “legal
transitions” literature).
2. Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change: The Constitutional Conundrum, 91 TEX. L. REV. 2015, 2015 (2013).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”).
4. See discussion infra Part II.
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The interaction between property rights and legal transitions is frequently fraught and fiercely contested. In the typical
situation, property owners object to newly imposed burdens following some change in the law. 5 But what if the need for legal
change can be anticipated far in advance—years, or even decades before new rules and regulations are adopted? Are there
tools available to the government ex ante that will preserve regulatory flexibility in the future by forestalling regulatory takings
claims and blunt the fairness concerns that fuel takings arguments in public debates? This Article identifies just such tools
and argues for their adoption specifically in the context of natural gas regulation. Natural gas presents an urgent and fascinating example precisely because we can predict the need for strict
new regulations in the future, while simultaneously embracing
the trend towards expanding use of natural gas today. This Article therefore examines the problem of natural gas in detail,
both because it is independently important and because it reveals the ways in which careful planning for the future can disarm property rights as a basis for objecting to necessary legal
change in other regulatory contexts.
Power generation in the United States is undergoing profound changes as new methods of producing natural gas drive
down costs while regulatory and other pressures on coal-fired
power plants precipitate a shift away from coal-generated power.
Generating a kilowatt of electricity by burning natural gas releases roughly half as much carbon dioxide (CO2) as generating
a kilowatt from coal, and a complete switch of electricity generation from coal to natural gas will prevent more than 700 million
metric tons (MMT) of CO2 emissions annually. 6 In the face of this
difference, many experts are advocating for the large-scale adoption of natural gas as quickly as possible.7
5. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 111–12 (discussing the coal industry’s objection to the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan).
6. Calculation based on data from U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA FOR OCTOBER 2016 tbl.1.1
(2016), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/archive/december2016.pdf; Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Carbon Dioxide Is Produced per KilowattHour when Generating Electricity with Fossil Fuels?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
[hereinafter FAQ], https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11 (last reviewed June 8, 2017).
7. See, e.g., Jay Apt, The Other Reason To Shift Away from Coal: Air Pollution That Kills Thousands Every Year, SCI. AM.: THE CONVERSATION (June 7,
2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-other-reason-to-shift
-away-from-coal-air-pollution-that-kills-thousands-every-year (arguing that a
shift to natural gas will, inter alia, improve public health).
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The transition from coal is underway, and natural gas is ascendant. Although deregulatory efforts by the new administration may have an effect, the increased use of natural gas is expected to continue even if the federal government continues to
back off of regulations designed to reduce coal-fired power generation over the next four to eight years.8 Deregulatory efforts
directed at natural gas fracking will only accelerate the process
by reducing the cost of natural gas. In addition, roughly onethird of all states, including California and New York, can be
expected to continue to pursue climate-mitigation regulatory initiatives, which will combine with the declining cost of natural
gas and renewables and the increasing pressure from major corporate buyers of renewable energy to reduce demand for coalfired power regardless of the status of the so-called regulatory
War on Coal. 9
Natural gas is still a fossil fuel, however, and despite the
carbon savings over coal, energy generated by natural gas is still
expected to produce 1685 MMT of CO2 in the year 2030, and 1835
MMT of CO2 in 2040. 10 Natural gas is therefore a bridge fuel. 11
It is a step along the path to a zero-carbon energy supply. But
experts anticipate that substantially reducing the risk of catastrophic climate change will require meeting a target of no more
than a two-degree-centigrade global temperature increase over
preindustrial levels (the goal adopted in the Paris Agreement). 12
8. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2017 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2050, at 69 (2017), https://www.eia.gov/
outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2017).pdf (projecting that natural gas use for electricity
generation over the 2016 to 2040 period would have increased more with implementation of the Clean Power Plan, as assumed by the Reference Case, but increased during this period even in the absence of the Clean Power Plan, as assumed in the No Clean Power Plan cases). Although certainly not a
disinterested analyst, then-President Barack Obama published a policy forum
essay in Science in which he projected that “[b]ecause the cost of new electricity
generation using natural gas is projected to remain low relative to coal, it is
unlikely that utilities will change course and choose to build coal-fired power
plants, which would be more expensive than natural gas plants, regardless of
any near-term changes in federal policy.” Barack Obama, The Irreversible Momentum of Clean Energy, 355 SCIENCE 126, 128 (2017).
9. See discussion infra Part I.B.
10. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2016 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at A-35 tbl.A18, https://www.eia
.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2016).pdf.
11. See, e.g., Christopher Helman, Energy Sec Chu Says Global Warming
Is Real; Nat Gas Will Be Bridge Fuel, FORBES (Mar. 9, 2010), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/energysource/2010/03/09/chu-global-warming-is-real.
12. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. I, ¶ 1(a), 2015.
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To meet this “2C climate goal,” the U.S. share of CO2 emissions
from the electricity sector will have to decline by over ninety percent by 2040 and shrink to zero by 2050.13
We can therefore predict today that there is a high likelihood that either a steep carbon tax or strict regulations limiting
the use of natural gas will be adopted within the next thirty
years.14 Although this is unlikely to occur in the next several
years, nature bats last and near-term delay will only increase
the magnitude of the emissions reductions necessary to address
the problem over the following decades. And we can predict with
equal certainty that owners and investors in natural-gas-fired
electric plants and the associated infrastructure—which together we call the natural gas industry15—will object to those
regulatory efforts. Other scholars and commenters have recognized the possibility that switching to natural gas might have
lock-in effects, making it more difficult to move to zero-carbon
sustainable sources of energy in the future. 16 They have identified the path dependency that results from building out an energy infrastructure, and the economic and political pressures
that make it difficult to change course.17 We identify and focus
on a different source of policy lock-in: the legal protection for
property entitlements, and the political pressures that accompany such protection.
A central objection to strict regulation of natural gas in the
future—whatever the precise regulatory form—is likely to be
that it amounts to an unconstitutional taking of vested property
rights. There are measures we can take today, though, to forestall those claims thirty years from now. One is relatively easy:
13. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 10.
14. See discussion infra Part I.A.
15. In this Article, the term natural gas industry includes natural gas wells
and pipelines that supply natural-gas-fired power plants, as well as the power
plants themselves. We exclude other parts of the natural gas business more
broadly construed—for example, home heating companies and others who rely
on natural gas production for transport and other purposes.
16. See, e.g., Symposium, Environmental and Social Implications of Hydraulic Fracturing and Gas Drilling in the United States: An Integrative Workshop for the Evaluation of the State of Science and Policy, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 245, 249 (2012) (“Some viewed natural gas as a transition fuel between
coal and renewables, while others expressed concern that investing in infrastructure to accommodate increased natural gas development would lock nations into natural gas dependence for decades.”).
17. See, e.g., MIT, THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS 67 (2011), https://
energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/MITEI-The-Future-of-Natural
-Gas.pdf (“ Trade flows can be particularly sensitive to the development of transportation infrastructure and political considerations . . . .”).
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the Takings Clause protects only reasonable investment-backed
expectations from significant adverse regulatory changes.18 By
developing a record today about what constitute reasonable expectations for natural gas investments, we can constrain takings
claims in the future. This can be done by public or private actors.
Regulators decades from now will be able to point back to contemporaneous reports, studies, and writing demonstrating that
investors knew or should have known that natural gas would
have a climate-imposed lifespan of only roughly thirty years.
Defining the extent of reasonable expectations today will
limit how investments in natural gas will be protected in the future. But it is no foolproof protection. We therefore also propose
a stronger response in the form of a regulatory innovation that
we label “prospective grandfathering.” According to current land
use doctrine, a government can—in certain circumstances—regulate away an existing use of property so long as it allows the
use to remain in place for some period after the new regulatory
prohibition.19 For example, a zoning change prohibiting adult
uses in a particular area might apply to a preexisting adult
bookstore. 20 This bookstore, now a prior nonconforming use, can
be given a prespecified amount of time to remain open, after
which, in many states, the government can shut it down without
paying compensation.21 This time-limited grandfathering, called
amortization, makes permissible what would otherwise have
been an unconstitutional regulatory taking, so long as the use is
allowed to stay open long enough for the owners to recover a sufficient portion of their investment in the property. 22
We propose a modified version of this approach where the
grandfathering happens ex ante, before the regulatory prohibition. By triggering an amortization period today, governments

18. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (describing
the Takings Clause as protecting “reasonable investment backed expectations”).
19. For an extended discussion and critique of this protection, see Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1222 (2009).
20. See Pa. Nw. Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372, 1373
(Pa. 1991), for a case involving exactly this situation.
21. See generally Serkin, supra note 19, at 1236 (discussing amortization).
22. See Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. City of Ridgeland, 797 So. 2d 898, 903 (Miss.
2001) (upholding “fairly established amortization periods” for pre-existing nonconforming billboards). But see Pa. Nw. Distribs., Inc., 584 A.2d at 1376 (invalidating amortization as a tool to eliminate prior nonconforming uses).
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will be free to regulate in the future because investors will already have recovered the value of their investments. 23 Like the
opposite of a sunset provision, we propose a kind of sunrise,
where federal or state agencies announce regulations today that
will become effective (or implemented) far in the future, and
owners can recover the value of their investments in the interim. 24 This applies beyond the context of natural gas, and
promises a new model for managing the costs of legal transitions.
The sunrise approach we propose is particularly appealing
for natural gas, however, because it is politically expedient. It
imposes few if any costs today, and states that support carbon
mitigation (roughly a third of all states with more than half of
the U.S. population) could adopt measures to implement this approach immediately. Over the longer run, this approach is a viable option for other states and the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). But it is also legally powerful. By
preventing future regulatory takings claims, it preserves important policy flexibility for future governments facing an increasingly dire need to respond to the threat of climate change.
It will also blunt political opposition to the inevitable regulations
because it amounts to a kind of bargain for temporary regulatory
forbearance that recalibrates what counts as fair treatment in
the future. We recognize that recent political events make aggressive EPA or other federal action unlikely in the near term,
even if costs are not borne until far into the future. After introducing the idea, we therefore focus specifically on ways in which
state regulators could implement prospective grandfathering,
particularly in conjunction with accelerated cost recovery in energy rates.

23. In energy policy, this resembles allowing recovery for stranded costs.
For an excellent analysis of the problem in these terms, see Emily Hammond &
Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 645
(2017).
24. Sunrise provisions have previously been explored in the context of constitutional rules. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 476 (2012) (“A close look
at the original Constitution and its amendments reveals clever, albeit too-rare,
use of the sunrise device to overcome immediate entrenched interests and injustices and thereby achieve a more disinterested and just future state of affairs.”); see also Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make Me Democratic, but Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975 (2015) (analyzing sunrise provisions in the U.S. Constitution).
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Legal scholars and political scientists voice a persistent
worry about the entrenching effect of government actions. 25 Governments frequently act in ways that limit policy choices in the
future, often imposing significant costs on subsequent generations. 26 This Article ultimately argues that we have a unique opportunity to do the opposite: to act today to preserve policy
choices for future governments. And it argues that the stakes are
so high when it comes to energy policy that even a small effect
on future regulatory incentives may make the difference between a sustainable and unsustainable future.
Part I surveys the leading contemporary literature on climate change and the need for reducing carbon emissions. Part I
also introduces the important role that natural gas can play in
our energy infrastructure, but for a limited time. Part II then
anticipates the takings challenges that the natural gas industry
is likely to raise when faced with regulatory actions decades from
now. It argues that takings liability is unlikely, but nevertheless
concludes that there is, in fact, a chance that necessary regulations in the future may violate the Takings Clause—or at least
that fear of takings claims will discourage policymakers from
adopting such regulations. Part III then proposes several responses that public and private actors could implement today
that would reduce, if not eliminate, that risk of takings liability
in the future. These include setting reasonable expectations for
the longevity of investments in natural gas and prospective
grandfathering, possibly through accelerated cost recovery for
natural gas infrastructure. Part III also explains how prospective grandfathering could usefully apply in other contexts.

25. See, e.g., Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment
and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 402–04 (2015) (describing the paralyzing
effects of entrenchment on labor and Social Security policy); Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 882 (2011) (considering how private law entrenchment
can upset a “carefully balanced equilibrium between stability and flexibility”).
26. See Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 384–85 (describing various ways legislatures can restrict future legislative action); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE
L.J. 1665, 1667 (2002) (defining entrenchment as “the enactment of either statutes or internal legislative rules that are binding against subsequent legislative
action in the same form”).
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I. NATURAL GAS AS A BRIDGE FUEL
The approaches we propose to address anticipated legal
changes apply in any context where new regulations are foreseeable far into the future. But they are particularly appropriate
and important for natural gas. This Part describes why natural
gas is a bridge fuel and why regulations will be needed at the
end of the bridge. This discussion is important because (1) it illustrates a context in which legal change is foreseeable and potentially problematic; and (2) as we argue in Part II, developing
a record of reasonable expectations is one way of preventing regulatory takings claims in the future.
A. THE ROLE OF NATURAL GAS IN CLIMATE MITIGATION
Electricity generation accounts for over 30 percent of U.S.
CO2 emissions. 27 Coal-fired electricity generation accounts for 76
percent of electricity sector fossil fuel emissions, 28 even though
it provides only 18.5 percent of the electricity generated.29 Assuming leakage and other emissions are held to a minimum, an
assumption we make in this Article (although we acknowledge
that experts differ on these issues), natural-gas-fired electric
generation yields roughly half the carbon emissions of coal per
kilowatt-hour of electricity generated. 30 This difference arises
because of a fundamental difference in the molecular structure
of coal and natural gas; coal has only two hydrogen bonds,
whereas natural gas has four. Since the energy release from combustion arises from breaking these bonds, half as much energy
is released from each coal molecule as from each natural gas molecule.

27. EPA, EPA 430-R-16-002, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSINKS: 1990–2014, at 3-14 (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2017-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2016-main-text.pdf.
28. Id. at 3-5. Fossil fuel combustion is the primary source of energy sector
CO2 emissions. Id. at 3-1.
29. Id. at 3-7.
30. Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Greater Focus Needed on Methane Leakage
from Natural Gas Infrastructure, 109 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 6435, 6438 tbl.1
(2012), http://www.pnas.org/content/109/17/6435.full.pdf; FAQ, supra note 6.
International Energy Agency (IEA) figures indicate that, depending on the type
of coal burned, coal-fired generation emits between 875 and 940 gCO2 per kilowatt-hour (kWh), while natural gas emits 405 gCO2 per kWh. INT’L ENERGY
AGENCY, CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION: HIGHLIGHTS
147 (2016), https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
CO2EmissionsfromFuelCombustion_Highlights_2016.pdf.

SIONS AND
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As a result of its low CO2 emissions as compared to coal, natural gas has been identified by researchers, 31 government policy
analysts, 32 and regulators 33 as a bridge fuel that can provide a
transition from the coal-dominated electric generation system of
the last century to one that is dominated by renewable or noncarbon emitting sources. In other words, if natural-gas-fired
electricity generation can substitute for coal-fired electricity generation over the next several decades, it can play a major role in
reducing the contribution of the electric generation sector to U.S.
emissions during this period. This trend has already begun to
play out in the United States, where natural gas has steadily
grown as a fuel for electricity generation; between 2005 and
2015, natural gas-fired generation almost doubled as a percentage of total U.S. electricity generation, growing from roughly 18
percent to more than 32 percent. 34 The increase in natural-gasfired generation has been made possible by the prolific construction of new natural-gas-fired power plants, with even more in
the pipeline. 35 Although the U.S. Energy Information Admin-

31. See MIT, supra note 17, at 2 passim (using the term bridge). The view
that natural gas provides less carbon emissions, and thus can serve as a bridge
to zero-carbon electricity generation is widely, but not universally, held. Some
researchers have pointed out the substantial methane emissions from natural
gas, and caution against its use as a bridge. E.g., Robert W. Howarth, A Bridge
to Nowhere: Methane Emissions and the Greenhouse Gas Footprint of Natural
Gas, 2014 ENERGY SCI. & ENGINEERING 1.
32. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011: ARE WE
ENTERING A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS? 7 (2011), http://www.worldenergyoutlook
.org/media/weowebsite/2011/WEO2011_GoldenAgeofGasReport.pdf (“[Natural
gas] can provide the flexibility and back-up capacity needed as more variable
capacity comes on-line in power generation.”).
33. See, e.g., Helman, supra note 11. Prior to his appointment as U.S. Secretary of Energy in 2013, Ernest Moniz stated publicly that “natural gas is truly
a bridge to a low-carbon future,” and that “in the very long run, very tight carbon
constraints will likely phase out natural gas power generation in favor of zerocarbon or extremely low-carbon energy sources.” Steven Mufson, Ernest Moniz,
MIT Physicist, Nominated as Energy Secretary, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ernest-moniz-mit-physicist
-is-to-be-nominated-as-energy-secretary/2013/03/04/e3fe68aa-808c-11e2-a350
-49866afab584_story.html.
34. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC
POWER ANNUAL 2015, at tbl.3.1.A (2016), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/
annual/archive/03482015.pdf.
35. Industry data shows that over thirty-one gigawatts (GW) of natural gas
electric power capacity was under construction in 2017. AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N,
AMERICA’S ELECTRICITY GENERATION CAPACITY, 2017 UPDATE, at 6 tbl.2.1
(2017), http://appanet.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/APPA_Generation_Capacity_
2017.pdf. The EIA projects that 18.7 GW of new capacity is scheduled to come
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istration (EIA) estimates that natural gas accounted for 27 percent of U.S. electricity production in 2015, this figure is predicted
to increase to 37 percent by 2040 as natural gas grows, and coal
and nuclear generation subside. 36
Natural gas is a bridge, however, not a complete response to
the climate problem. If natural gas displaces coal for electricity
generation, a net carbon reduction from the U.S. electricity sector will occur, but simply transitioning to a lower-emitting fossil
fuel will be insufficient to meet the 2C climate goal articulated
in the Paris Agreement, much less the aspiration of 1.5 °C. 37 The
Obama Administration committed to reducing U.S. carbon dioxide emissions by 26 percent to 28 percent by 2025, and the transition to natural gas was expected to contribute the largest share
of these emissions reductions. 38 The challenge for regulators is
that the U.S. share of the global emissions reductions necessary
to achieve the 2C goal increases steeply to roughly 70 percent to
80 percent reductions by 2050. 39 In addition, the required U.S.
emissions reductions will become even more stringent after
2050; near-zero emissions will be required in the 2050–2070 period and net negative emissions will be required during the last
third to quarter of this century.40 The recently-announced Paris
on line between 2016 and 2018. Victoria Zaretskaya, Many Natural Gas-Fired
Power Plants Under Construction Are Near Major Shale Plays, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (May 19, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail
.php?id=26312. Eighty-five GW are projected to be added through 2035. Natural
Gas and Renewable Shares of Electricity Generation To Grow, Coal Still Largest, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 10, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4950.
36. See Annual Energy Outlook 2016, Table: Electricity Supply, Disposition,
Prices, and Emissions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/
outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=8-AEO2016&sourcekey=0 (last reviewed Oct.
9, 2017).
37. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. I, ¶ 1(a), 2015.
38. See Intended Nationally Determined Contribution Submitted by the
United States of America to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/
Published%20Documents/United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20
Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf.
39. Id. Consistent with the 2C climate goal, the U.S. Department of State
has announced a goal of reducing net emissions by 83 percent below 2005 levels
in 2050. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2010,
at 3, 6 (2010), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/usa_nc5.pdf.
40. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ANNUAL WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 150, 166
(2015), https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
WEO2015.pdf (showing an increased use of natural gas in nearer years, followed by a decrease in later years to achieve a 450ppm atmospheric concentration of CO2, which is often associated with the 2C goal).
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Agreement withdrawal 41 and various domestic deregulatory efforts may take some of the legal pressure off at times over the
next decade, but these deregulatory efforts will only increase the
need to transition away from natural gas by 2050, since even
greater emissions reductions will be necessary over the 2030–
2050 period if these deregulatory efforts increase U.S. emissions
in the interim.
These estimates of future U.S. emissions reductions thus
suggest that it will be necessary to phase out even natural-gasbased carbon emissions by the 2040–2050 period. 42 Similar transitions away from natural gas will be required in many other
countries. 43 Although steep emissions reductions from other sectors of the economy could reduce the pressure on natural-gas
fired power plants, studies suggest that efforts to decarbonize
other sectors will face higher costs and other hurdles. For example, a 2014 study by two leading laboratories notes that cutting
emissions from sectors that rely heavily on gas and oil (for example, motor vehicle use and air transport) would require replacing natural gas with biofuel and offsetting the remaining
emissions with carbon capture and storage (CCS). 44 We note,
however, that “commercial or near-commercial technologies and
limits on biomass availability and [CCS] deployment” make it
“difficult to decarbonize both gas and liquid fuel supplies.” 45 The
electricity sector thus is likely to shoulder a greater load of emissions reductions, and this research suggests that power-sector
emissions ultimately would need to fall to zero. 46
If even natural-gas-fired power generation will need to be
phased out by 2050, the bridge for natural gas should begin to
slope down within two decades and should not extend for more
41. See Robinson Meyer, Trump and the Paris Agreement: What Just Happened?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/
2017/08/trump-and-the-paris-agreement-what-just-happened/536040.
42. See, e.g., JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., PATHWAYS TO DEEP CARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, at xi (2014), http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/09/US-Deep-Decarbonization-Report.pdf (predicting the attainment of
“deep decarbonization” by phasing out natural gas-fired electricity generation).
43. See MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND
POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (forthcoming Dec. 2017) (examining carbon emissions pathways and concluding that
even if all of the countries that made commitments in the Paris Agreement fulfill all of their commitments, the resulting pathway has a low probability of
achieving the 2C goal).
44. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 42, at 17.
45. Id. at xiii.
46. Id. at xiii, 14.
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than roughly thirty years. The rapid installation of new naturalgas-fired capacity, combined with the expected life of naturalgas-fired power plants, however, could make this difficult. Utilities will resist shuttering newly built power plants during their
useful lifetime, which according to a survey of plants retired
from 2000 to 2010, is an average of roughly fifty years.47 Assuming that plants built today have a similar or even longer lifespan,
this figure suggests that decarbonizing the electricity sector by
2050 will necessitate the early closure of otherwise functional
plants.
Plants built before 2000 will be at the end of their useful
lives as we approach the 2040–2050 period, but the decades-long
controversy over the Clean Air Act new source review (NSR) process for coal-fired power plants demonstrates that utilities have
incentives to lobby and litigate aggressively to resist efforts to
shutter plants that at least arguably were expected to close at
the end of their useful lives. 48 The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970 and 1977 grandfathered existing power plants.49 The expectation of many at the time, and arguably the intent of Congress, was that the power plants would become obsolete and
eventually would be replaced by more efficient and cleaner
ones. 50 These newer plants were subject to more stringent emissions standards, and substantial upgrades to existing plants also

47. Melissa C. Lott, Natural Gas—Leading Retirements, New Capacity,
SCI. AM.: PLUGGED IN (Dec. 14, 2011), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/
plugged-in/natural-gas-leading-the-retirements-board (“[T]he average age of
these recently retired natural gas power plants was 48 years . . . .”).
48. For an overview, see RICHARD L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING
FOR AIR: POWER PLANTS AND THE “WAR ON COAL” (2016). Revesz and Lienke
note that the regulatory standards included in the 1970 and 1977 amendments
to the Clean Air Act applied only to new power plants and grandfathered in
preexisting plants. They conclude that the effect was to make new facilities
more costly to run whereas old facilities—which Congress had assumed would
retire after their thirty-year estimated useful lifespan—became more valuable
precisely because of their regulatory advantage. Id. at 33. As a result, Congress
grossly underestimated the effect of exempting existing facilities, and by 2012,
over seventy-five percent of the grandfathered coal-fired plants had exceeded
their expected lifespan, some by double. Id. at 33, 54.
49. Clean Air Act § 111(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2012) (applying the
Clean Air Act to sources of which “the construction or modification . . . is commenced after the publication of regulations”).
50. See NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., A BREATH OF FRESH AIR: REVIVING
THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM 14 (2003), https://napa.primedev.build/
uploads/Academy_Studies/03_02AbreathofFreshAirRevivingtheNewSource
ReviewProgram.pdf (“Congress intended NSR to assure that new sources would
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triggered the new, stricter standards. 51 In fact, however, the
ability of older plants to continue producing power without meeting higher emission standards made them particularly valuable.
Instead of slow obsolescence, the plants continued to operate far
beyond what would have been their normal operating life. 52
Decades later, the Clinton EPA brought enforcement actions
against heavily upgraded existing plants that did not comply
with new plant standards. The enforcement actions asserted
that the industry had made major modifications to existing
plants without installing the required upgrades. 53 These enforcement actions triggered a long, partially successful battle by
electric utilities, which litigated against the enforcement actions
and lobbied EPA and Congress to allow the plants to continue
operating. 54 The Bush administration later adopted policies that
allowed the power plants to be improved without meeting the
higher emissions standards, reasoning that the incremental improvement was better than nothing. 55
be clean, existing sources would become cleaner over time, and a moving frontier of improved technology would be the benchmark against which ‘clean’ is
measured . . . .”).
51. See New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding EPA
regulations requiring construction permits for plant modifications that substantially increase emissions).
52. See Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, The Tragic Flaw of the Clean Air
Act, REG. REV. (May 17, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/05/17/revesz
-lienke-tragic-flaw-clean-air-act (“[T]he economically useful life of a coal plant
[when the CAA was drafted] was thought to be about 30 years. But by 2012,
more than three-quarters of the nation’s coal-fired generation capacity had been
in service for longer than that. . . . [A]lmost 40 percent of . . . coal-fired infrastructure was more than 40 years old, and close to 20 percent was more than 50
years old.”).
53. Richard Revesz & Jonathan Remy Nash, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U.
L. REV. 1677, 1693 (2007).
54. See, e.g., id. at 1687–89 (2007) (noting the response of the industry to
EPA regulations).
55. See EPA: New Source Review Is Hurting Power Projects That Would
Improve Reliability, POWER ENG’G INT’L (June 17, 2002), http://www
.powerengineeringint.com/articles/2002/06/epa-new-source-review-is-hurting
-power-projects-that-would-improve-reliability.html (statement of then-EPA
Administrator Christie Whitman) (arguing the Bush reforms would “promote
energy efficiency . . . and modernization” and create “opportunities for pollution
prevention and energy efficiency”); see also Dana Joel Gattuso, Why the New
Source Review Program Needs Reform: A Primer on NSR, BACKGROUNDER (The
Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 21, 2002, at 1, 2, http://www.heritage
.org/environment/report/why-the-new-source-review-program-needs-reform
-primer-nsr (describing the Bush reforms as “much-needed” and “not expected
to roll back regulations on industrial air emissions”).
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Assuming an average lifespan, a large number of naturalgas plants built after 2000 will need to be shut down while they
are still in the midst of their useful life. Between 2001 and 2015,
the United States added 3213 natural-gas-fired generators 56 at
203 plants, 57 representing roughly $130 billion in capital investments.58 Likewise, an additional 195 natural-gas-fired generators, representing roughly $31 billion in capital investments are
expected to be built between 2018 and 2020. 59 As the NSR battles of the 1990s and early 2000s suggest, these valuable assets
will not be abandoned lightly. 60
Perhaps in an early signal of the conflict just over the horizon, natural gas industry officials have described natural gas as
a foundation fuel, rather than a bridge fuel.61 Furthermore, natural gas infrastructure includes more than just the power plants
56. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC
POWER ANNUAL 2015, at tbl.4.3 (2016) https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/
archive/03482015.pdf (providing count of generators); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0348(2001), ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL
2001, at 18 tbl.2.2 (2003), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/
03482001.pdf.
57. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC
POWER ANNUAL 2015, at tbl.4.1 (2016), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/
archive/03482015.pdf; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
DOE/EIA-0348(2008), ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2008, at tbl.5.1 (2010), https://
www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/03482008.pdf (providing count of natural gas plants).
58. Estimations for capital costs calculated by multiplying the most recent
(2015) EIA estimates of cost per kW of natural-gas generator construction by
net addition in summer generation capacity between 2001 and 2015. See U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2015
tbl.4.2.A (2016), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/03482015.pdf;
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0348(2008),
ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2008, at 16 tbl.1.1 (2010), http://www.eia.gov/
electricity/annual/archive/03482008.pdf; Construction Cost Data for Electric
Generators Installed in 2013, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 3, 2016), https://
www.eia.gov/electricity/generatorcosts/archive/2013.
59. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC
POWER ANNUAL 2015, at tbl.4.5 (2016), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/
archive/03482015.pdf; Construction Cost Data for Electric Generators Installed
in 2013, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 3, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/
electricity/generatorcosts/archive/2013.
60. The NSR controversy is ongoing. See, e.g., Art Fraas et al., EPA’s New
Source Review Program: Time for Reform?, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10026, 10031–32
(2017) (examining history of ongoing regulation and litigation surrounding
NSR).
61. We have not located any official statement from a natural gas interest
identifying natural gas as a bridge fuel. Instead, the industry stance seems to
be that it is a foundation fuel that should support the U.S. economy far into the
future. See, e.g., AM. PETROLEUM INST., 2016 STATE OF AMERICAN ENERGY 46
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themselves. Natural gas transmission pipelines also represent
significant investments that will have a physical lifespan that
exceeds the critical period from 2040–2050. 62 If natural gas is no
longer usable, these pipelines will also lose their utility. The
same is true of wells, although they typically have a shorter
lifespan.63 Nevertheless, we can anticipate that at least some
wells could remain active and productive beyond the viability of
natural gas as a source of power. In sum, policymakers today are
on notice that the owners and operators of natural gas power
plants and related infrastructure will fight vigorously to extend
the bridge far beyond what is needed for climate policy.
B. THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO NATURAL GAS
Policymakers will have several options to induce the phaseout of natural-gas-fired power plants by 2050, actions that would

(2016), http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/SOAE-2016/API-2016-SOAE
-Report.pdf (“[T]he long-term trend is clear: We will need more energy, specifically oil and natural gas, for decades to come.”); Natural Gas Emissions, AM.
GAS ASS’N, https://www.aga.org/policy/environment/natural-gas-emissions (last
visited Jan. 31, 2018) (“AGA believes that natural gas is poised to serve as a
foundation fuel for the U.S. economy for years to come.”). Marty Durbin, the
head of America’s Natural Gas Alliance, stated publicly in 2015 that natural
gas “is no longer a bridge; it’s a foundation for the economy and will be for a long
time.” ANGA’s Durbin Discusses Merger Talks, Future of Natural Gas Under
Power Plan and Methane Rules, E&ETV: ONPOINT (Sept. 10, 2015),
http://www.eenews.net/tv/videos/2027/transcript.
62. JOHN F. KIEFNER & MICHAEL J. ROSENFELD, INTERSTATE NAT. GAS
ASS’N OF AM., THE ROLE OF PIPELINE AGE IN PIPELINE SAFETY 12–15, 25–30
(2012), http://www.ingaa.org/file.aspx?id=19307 (discussing pipeline age and
various factors that contribute to pipeline operation and safety).
63. Although the productive lifetime of natural gas wells varies across different plays, a conservative estimate is that most wells experience a decline in
production of 40 to 60 percent over their first year, implying a productive lifetime of thirty to forty years. See J. D. HUGHES, POST CARBON INST., DRILL,
BABY, DRILL: CAN UNCONVENTIONAL FUELS USHER IN A NEW ERA OF ENERGY
ABUNDANCE? 54 (2011), http://liege.mpoc.be/doc/energie/carbonefossile/-~En
-anglais/Hughes-David_Drill-Baby-Drill_178pages-31Mo_fevrier2013.pdf
(showing production life estimates for Haynesville shale); U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0383(2012), ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2035, at 59 fig.54 (2012), https://www.eia.gov/
outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf (demonstrating rapid decline of production in
early part of shale lives). Production from some wells declines up to 80 percent
over the first year, suggesting a shorter productive lifespan. See James R. Ladlee, Natural Gas Production Decline Curve and Royalty Estimation, PA. STATE
UNIV. EXTENSION, https://extension.psu.edu/natural-gas-production-decline
-curve-and-royalty-estimation (last updated Aug. 8, 2017) (“ The average first
year decline rates across Pennsylvania appear to range from approximately 60%
to 80%.”).
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also affect transmission pipelines and wells. For instance, pricing carbon via a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system could undermine the economic viability of these plants. Direct federal
regulatory requirements could include a ban on carbon emissions from power plants or emissions standards that cannot be
achieved through natural-gas-fired generation. EPA also could
set the standards at a level that natural-gas-fired power plants
could meet, but only with carbon capture and storage equipment
that renders the plants more costly than competing forms of generation. Some have argued that the standard included in EPA’s
Clean Power Plan for existing coal-fired power plants and New
Source Performance Standards for new coal-fired power plants
adopted this approach.64
Although the 2016 presidential election has resulted in the
withdrawal or suspension of several climate measures and
thrown federal climate policy into a period of uncertainty, the
climate problem is not going away, and over the longer term the
federal government is likely to return to the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from power plants. In addition, the governments of roughly one-third of the states are likely to take additional steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 65 States in this
group, including California, New York, and Massachusetts, (1)
are responsible for a large share of U.S. power consumption; (2)
have state climate laws that are unlikely to be preempted by
Congress; and (3) are likely to continue to create regulatory incentives for shifting from coal to natural gas for electric power
plants and ultimately to renewable sources.66 Many local governments also have adopted carbon goals and some operate their
own electric power plants. 67
64. See, e.g., Nicolas D. Loris, The Many Problems of the EPA’s Clean Power
Plan and Climate Regulations: A Primer, BACKGROUNDER (The Heritage
Found., Washington, D.C.), July 7, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/environment/
report/the-many-problems-the-epas-clean-power-plan-and-climate-regulations
-primer (criticizing the Clean Power Plan).
65. See GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR., STATE LEADERSHIP DRIVING THE
SHIFT TO CLEAN ENERGY: 2016 UPDATE (2016), http://www.georgetownclimate
.org/files/report/Final_GCC_State_Leadership_Driving_the_Shift_to_Clean_
Energy_11Nov2016v2_1.pdf (reporting the status of various states’ efforts to
shift to cleaner energy).
66. Id. at 4–5, 17–19, 28–29.
67. See, e.g., U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, U.S. MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION AGREEMENT 1 (2005), http://www.mayors.org/climateprotection/
documents/mcpAgreement.pdf (listing steps municipalities will take to limit climate change). An example of a municipality that owns power plants is Austin,
Texas. See Company Profile: Power Plants, AUSTIN ENERGY, https://z.umn.edu/
AustinEnergy (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
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These government regulatory moves are likely to be supported by the increasing demand for renewable power from large
corporations. Many leading corporate electricity users, such as
Microsoft, Google, and Facebook, have set stringent corporate
carbon goals, and over 400 large corporations have adopted internal corporate carbon prices to steer internal corporate decision-making.68 These large buyers are creating demand for a
shift from fossil-fuel-based electricity to renewables in many
states, including states that have opposed the federal climate
regulatory efforts, and this demand for renewables may expand
to include smaller firms. 69 Private climate-governance initiatives such as these will not force a transition away from natural
gas on their own, but they may contribute to the long-term transition, as politicians take note and as utilities seek not only to
respond to government regulators, but also to serve their largest
customers.
Regardless of the success of interim public and private efforts, and regardless of the regulatory instrument selected and
the level of government that acts, future government action may
have the effect of eliminating billions of dollars of investments
in natural gas power plants. We know today that these plants
must cease emitting carbon by roughly 2040–2050, 70 but if investors have expectations about extracting value from these investments they are likely to lobby heavily against these new policies. In this process, regulators and Congress may have

68. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock,
40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 260 (2015); see also CDP, PUTTING A PRICE ON RISK:
CARBON PRICING IN THE CORPORATE WORLD (2015), https://www.oceanfdn.org/
sites/default/files/CDP%20Carbon%20Pricing%20in%20the%20corporate%20
world.compressed.pdf; Sarah E. Light, The New Insider Trading: Environmental Markets Within the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 41–50 (2015); David Ferris, Tech Giants Lead Campaign To Bring Renewables to Reluctant States, E&E
NEWS (May 23, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060037674.
69. See David Ferris & Kristi E. Swartz, Southern Utilities Stand in the
Way of Making the Internet Greener—Report, E&E NEWS (May 12, 2015),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060018386 (noting that “[b]ig tech companies
like Google and Facebook are on the way to powering their data centers with
renewable energy, but an obstacle stands in their path: the biggest utilities in
Virginia and North Carolina”); Ferris, supra note 68 (discussing corporate membership in Renewable Energy Buyers Alliance).
70. Jeff Spross, At This Rate, The World Will Have To Cease All Carbon
Emissions in 2040 To Stay Under 2°C, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 17, 2014), https://
www.thinkprogress.org/at-this-rate-the-world-will-have-to-cease-all-carbon
-emissions-in-2040-to-stay-under-2-c (arguing that to limit climate change, carbon emissions must cease by 2040).
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concerns about takings claims by the affected utilities. Regardless of the success of actual takings cases, the perceived threat
of takings claims may be the greatest impediment to regulatory
change. This perception has affected policymakers at the local,
state and federal levels across many issues and is likely to be
influential in the coming end-of-bridge debates. 71
Thus we are in the unusual position of being able to anticipate the end of the bridge even as we are building it. Are we
smart enough to put policies in place that will allow it to end? Or
will we lose the opportunity to construct an end to the bridge,
leading to protracted conflicts and an increased chance of exceeding climate emissions reduction goals? The problem is a temporal one: Can we anticipate today the legal and political challenges to phasing out natural gas in the future? It turns out we
can, and identifying these challenges also suggests important
steps that we can take to ensure regulatory flexibility in the future.
II. LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE NATURAL GAS
INFRASTRUCTURE
It is easy to imagine the legal landscape thirty to forty years
from now. If current predictions are correct, the world will have
nearly tapped out its carbon budget to keep climate change from
reaching catastrophic levels. However, the American electrical
grid will be dependent in large measure on natural gas. Renewables will supply a larger share of electric generation, but a robust natural gas infrastructure will have been in place for decades, from wells to pipelines to power plants. Each will represent
substantial investments, the returns from which will be dependent upon the ongoing production of power through natural gas.
If a regulator were to seek to eliminate those natural gas resources, either outright, through the imposition of restrictive
emissions rules, or through a carbon price, owners would almost
certainly object.72 Everyone involved in the production, transportation, and use of natural gas would likely try to protect their
71. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is
There a “Race” and Is It “ To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 321–37 (noting
the importance of perceptions by government officials that industry will relocate
if more stringent regulations are adopted); James L. Huffman, Why Liberating
the Public Trust Doctrine Is Bad for the Public, 45 ENVTL. L. 337, 359–60 (2015)
(quoting Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: Reclaiming an Environmental
Discourse, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 257 (2007) (“ This private property rights
rhetoric has cowered officials at every level of government . . . .”)).
72. See, e.g., Petition for Review, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 16-1264 (D.C.
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investments. And they would have at least some law on their
side.
The primary source of constitutional protection for property
comes from the Takings Clause. 73 Indeed, the natural gas industry is likely to invoke the Takings Clause to try to shield itself
from regulations that substantially interfere with its investments. A close look at the doctrine reveals that the Constitution
should not, and probably will not, constrain future regulators.
Nevertheless, this conclusion remains speculative. In the face of
uncertainty, it is important to consider how the Takings Clause
might operate to constrain what we view as the inevitable regulation of natural gas. The discussion that follows serves an additional purpose, as well. By examining how the Takings Clause
might apply to the future regulation of natural gas, it sets the
stage for Part III and our proposals preventing takings liability.
A. THE TAKINGS PROBLEM IN ENERGY TRANSITIONS
There are two potentially relevant bases for takings liability
that could apply to in-place natural gas infrastructure. 74 The
first is the per se takings rule from Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council. 75 According to Lucas, a total wipeout of all economically valuable use of property is always a taking.76 These
Cir. Aug. 2, 2016) (featuring challenges to EPA’s coal-fired power plant rules).
A carbon tax is the least likely to implicate property protection because the Takings Clause traditionally, if controversially, does not apply to taxes. See Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2183–93
(2004).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
74. We are confident that substantive due process protections will not apply
to protect natural gas infrastructure from future regulations. See, e.g., Serkin,
supra note 19, at 1256–58 (“After [Lochner] was overruled, substantive due process protection for most economic rights all but ended.”); Mark Tunick, Constitutional Protections of Private Property: Decoupling the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 899 n.59 (2001) (“Since the demise of
Lochner, the Court has been reluctant to strike down economic legislation on
due process grounds . . . .”). While modern courts have occasionally invalidated
zoning regulations on this basis, the usual approach is still highly deferential
to the government. For a summary and discussion of these cases, see, for example, ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 110 (4th ed. 2013); see
also DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCIETY THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION 10–11 (1993) (describing the spectrum
in state court deference under the Due Process Clause).
75. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
76. See id. at 1027 (“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner ’s estate
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”).
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total wipeouts are vanishingly rare. In Lucas itself, the Supreme
Court reached its result only because the government had stipulated to the fact of the total wipeout. 77 Since then, governments
have refused to make such concessions, and courts have almost
always found that regulated property retains sufficient residual
value to prevent application of the rule.78 We are aware of only
one recent case in which the Federal Circuit upheld the determination of a total wipeout, and it was on an unusual set of facts. 79
Regulations that merely make natural gas more expensive—even significantly so—will not trigger the total wipeout
rule.80 Regulatory requirements like carbon capture and sequestration or a carbon tax might well make natural gas facilities
less valuable, but will not rise to the level of a total wipeout under current law. 81
Even outright bans on natural gas are unlikely to rise to the
level of a Lucas total wipeout. Factually, it may be that natural
gas facilities could be put to some entirely alternative use. If a
plant could be converted to run on an alternative fuel, or the land
itself turned into a factory or other use, then even a regulation
eliminating a natural gas plant might not be a total wipeout.82
Something along these lines occurred recently when Google located a data center at the site of the former Widows Creek coalfired power plant in Alabama. 83 Admittedly, though, such alternatives seem unlikely to be the norm. We presume—at least for
77. See CHRISTOPHER SERKIN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 266 (2d ed. 2013).
78. See, e.g., Pallazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630–32 (2001) (concluding that $200,000 in retained development value constituted more than “a
few crumbs of value” and so the regulation at issue did not rise to the level of a
taking under Lucas).
79. See Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111, 1116–17 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (finding the denial of a permit to fill a wetland, which the trial court
had concluded deprived the parcel of 99.4 percent of its value, to be a per se
taking under Lucas).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 77–79 (describing limited applicability of total wipeout rule).
81. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331–32 (2002) (holding that a thirty-two-month moratorium on development was not a total wipeout under Lucas); see also Walcek v.
United States, 303 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding no taking under
Lucas when a wetlands permit allowed development on 2.2 acres of a 13.2-acre
parcel).
82. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 19, at 1229–30 (examining how the availability of alternative uses relates to the elimination of an existing use).
83. See Press Release, Google, A Power Plant for the Internet: Our Newest
Data Center in Alabama (June 24, 2015), https://googleblog.blogspot.com/
2015/06/a-power-plant-for-internet-our-newest.html; Press Release, TVA,
Google Chooses TVA Site for Next Data Center (June 24, 2015), https://www
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the sake of argument today—that natural gas plants are useful
only for generating power from natural gas. Moreover, it is implausible to think that the property could be converted to many
nonindustrial uses. 84 Even an alternative industrial development might require such extensive remediation and retrofitting
as to be effectively impossible.
Natural gas infrastructure includes more than just power
plants. Pipelines also cannot be easily converted to transport
other materials. The obvious hurdles are physical, but the legal
ones may be equally important. Many pipeline companies do not
own fee simple title to the property under their pipelines, but
instead only easements over land held in fee simple by someone
else.85 Where that is true, depending on how the easement is
worded, the pipeline cannot be converted to different purposes
without impermissibly expanding the scope of the easement. 86
For the same reason, the pipeline cannot be removed and replaced with another kind of transmission line, let alone a bike
trail, walking path, or other kind of right-of-way. 87 Therefore, if
.tva.gov/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Google-Chooses-TVA-Site-for-Next-Data
-Center.
84. See Sarah K. Adair et al., Considering Shale Gas Extraction in North
Carolina: Lessons from Other States, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 257, 280–
87, 291–99 (2012) (discussing the various environmental concerns that arise at
shale gas extraction sites); Terry W. Roberson, Environmental Concerns of Hydraulically Fracturing a Natural Gas Well, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 115–35
(2012) (exploring the environmental issues with hydraulic fracking); Hannah
Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
229, 242 (2010) (“[A]ny oil or gas producer that contaminates a site with wastes
other than petroleum or natural gas may be subject to future liability for cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act . . . .”).
85. See, e.g., Alejandro Davila Fragoso, For-Profit Pipelines Are Growing
and So Are Eminent Domain Battles, THINKPROGRESS (June 7, 2016), https://
thinkprogress.org/for-profit-pipelines-are-growing-and-so-are-eminent-domain
-battles (quoting a pipeline company’s statement that ninety-six percent of the
route for the controversial Dakota Access Pipeline was secured with easements);
cf. INGAA FOUND., INC., BUILDING INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION
PIPELINES: A PRIMER 19–23, 30–31 (2013), http://www.ingaa.org/file
.aspx?id=19618 (detailing the process of easement acquisition for natural gas
pipelines).
86. See Stew-Mc Dev., Inc. v. Fischer, 770 N.W.2d 839, 846–48 (Iowa 2009)
(concluding that an easement originally granted for farm access could not be
used for access to a residential development); Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 517
(Wash. 1986) (“As a general rule, an easement appurtenant to one parcel of land
may not be extended by the owner of the dominant estate to other parcels owned
by him . . . to which the easement is not appurtenant.”).
87. Cf. Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It is
elementary law that if the Government uses . . . an existing railroad easement
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natural gas is regulated out of existence as an energy supply, the
pipeline transmission infrastructure may become valueless.88
Even assuming for the sake of argument that government
regulations in the future might effectuate a total wipeout of all
economically valuable use of natural gas facilities, that wipeout
may still not be a taking. The imposition of such a regulatory
regime is actually quite similar to alcohol prohibition in the late
nineteenth century.89 There, investments made in distilleries
were suddenly rendered valueless when alcohol was banned.
When one distillery owner in Kansas sued, claiming that the
state’s prohibition on alcohol amounted to a taking of his property, the Supreme Court rejected the argument in Mugler v.
Kansas. 90 The Court held: “A prohibition simply upon the use of
for purposes and in a manner not allowed by the terms of the grant of the easement, the Government has taken the landowner ’s property for the new
use. . . . And it appears beyond cavil that use of these easements for a recreational trail . . . is not the same use made by a railroad . . . .”); Preseault v. United
States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1541–44 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that a railroad rightof-way could not be converted to a public recreational trail); Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 703–06 (Tex. 2002) (holding that an easement for “electric transmission or distribution line or system” did not permit
use for cable-television lines).
88. Those individual property interests are not necessarily the correct denominator for takings purposes. Severing the easement or the lease from the
underlying land does not necessarily mean that these smaller interests are the
relevant constitutional property. See Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then
Some: Unity of Ownership and the Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549, 562–
63 (2012) (“[T]he baseline for ‘parcel as a whole’ remains the deeded parcel.”);
Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS
L.J. 663, 694–706 (1996) (exploring the various dimensions of the denominator
problem under Supreme Court doctrine); see also Murr v. State,
No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL7271581, at *4–5 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2014) (characterizing two separate but contiguous parcels owned by the plaintiffs as the
relevant property interest and therefore rejecting the regulatory takings claim),
rev. denied, 862 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2015), aff ’d, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017); Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192–93 (1967) (discussing the difficulty of defining the relevant property interest for a takings
determination); Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a
Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis,
34 ENVTL. L. 175, 190–93 (2004) (highlighting the “intractable” problems with
“identifying the bundle from which a particular property right has been taken”).
89. See Lloyd C. Anderson, Direct Shipment of Wine, the Commerce Clause
and the Twenty-First Amendment: A Call for Legislative Reform, 37 AKRON L.
REV. 1, 5–6 (2004) (describing the nineteenth-century prohibition adopted in
some states); Kenneth M. Murchison, Prohibition and the Fourth Amendment:
A New Look at Some Old Cases, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 473–74
(1982) (reviewing the historical context of the nineteenth-century prohibition
movement).
90. 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887).
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property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to
be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community,
cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation
of property for the public benefit.” 91
The Mugler principle, repeated in subsequent cases, is that
valid regulations designed to protect the public from harm do not
violate the Takings Clause. 92 As the public harm of carbon emissions comes more clearly into view, the “evils” of liquor seem but
a trifling delight in comparison. If Kansas could eliminate distilleries on grounds that it was protecting the public from alcohol, surely the federal government in the future can eliminate
natural gas facilities to protect the planet from catastrophic climate change. While Lucas casts that sensible-seeming conclusion into some doubt, we are hopeful that a court decades from
now would defer to a legislative determination that carbon is
harmful and refuse to find a taking on that basis. 93 But given
the state of the law today, we cannot predict that outcome with
certainty. 94
Assuming Lucas will not apply, any regulation of natural
gas facilities in the future will be judged under Penn Central’s

91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn.
1996) (“If the state regulation appears genuinely designed to prevent harm to
the public and is likely to achieve that goal and the harm suffered by the property owner does not appear to be one that should be borne by the entire community, we will not find a taking.” (citing Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661–62)). Zeman
went on to uphold an ordinance allowing the revocation of rental licenses for
dwellings involved in three “disorderly use” incidents, stating that the ordinance “serves a public harm prevention purpose and, properly implemented, it
will likely be advantageous to all involved. Accordingly, we see no taking here.”
Id. at 555; see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410–14 (1915) (denying a takings claim concerning an ordinance that prohibited brick yards within
a city’s limits); Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI.
L. REV. 553, 573 (2012) (“Courts have long held that a government can prevent
public harms without violating the Takings Clause.”).
93. Writing for the majority in Lucas, Justice Scalia sharply criticized the
traditional “harm-prevent[ion]” defense from Mugler and its progeny. Reasoning that the difference between a harm and a benefit is “often in the eye of the
beholder,” he concluded that the only defense to a total wipeout of all economically beneficial uses of land is that the regulation is consistent with “background
principles of . . . property and nuisance” law. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1023–30 (1992).
94. Cf. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (concluding
that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law tort actions by states
against major utilities for greenhouse gas emissions, revealing unpredictability
in courts’ attitudes towards climate change).
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three-factor ad hoc balancing test, which focuses on (1) the character of the regulation; (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the resulting diminution in value.95 This test is notoriously difficult to
apply.96 Each factor in the Penn Central test is contested, but the
second prong—the extent to which the regulation interferes with
property owners’ expectations—is particularly so.97 As originally
articulated by the Supreme Court, the focus of the inquiry is on
a property owner’s “distinct investment-backed expectations.” 98
Its purpose is to distinguish between those expectations that are
particularly well crystalized (which should be protected), and
those that are more speculative (which should not). 99 The dividing line for constitutional protection is not necessarily between
existing uses and prospective future uses of property; the formulation implicitly acknowledges that some prospective uses could
still be sufficiently distinct as to deserve takings protection. But
it clearly anticipates strong protection for uses already in place,
like a developed natural gas infrastructure. 100
However, just one year after Penn Central, in Kaiser Aetna

95. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see
also Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 307, 333–46 (2007) (expounding on each of these three factors).
96. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 741 (2005) (“Looking for
consistency in takings cases is a little bit like finding shapes in the clouds: you
can see them if you look hard enough, but they say more about the observer
than [about] the clouds themselves.”).
97. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262–63 (1980) (holding that
an ordinance only permitting single-family housing did not unduly interfere
with the expectations of a developer who desired to build multifamily housing),
abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); see also Daniel
R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW.
215, 225–37 (1995) (critiquing Penn Central’s second prong).
98. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
99. See Michelman, supra note 88, at 1233 (“ The [reasoning behind this
factor] seems to be that actual establishment of the use demonstrates that the
prospect of continuing it is a discrete twig out of his fee simple bundle to which
the owner makes explicit reference in his own thinking, so that enforcement of
the restriction would, as he looks at the matter, totally defeat a distinctly crystallized expectation.”).
100. According to Professor Frank Michelman’s famous formulation of this
test, interference with existing uses of property tend to come with high demoralization costs and relatively low settlement costs. See id. at 1234 (stating that
restrictions of existing uses generate “pain of a . . . demoralizing kind” that can
be “identified by compensation tribunals with relative ease”).
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v. United States, 101 the Supreme Court restated the Penn Central factors but with a subtle and unacknowledged change: it replaced “distinct” with “reasonable” investment-backed expectations. 102 This alternative formulation allows governments to
argue that even distinct plans are unreasonable. The focus on
“reasonable” expectations principally serves to limit takings protection for unreasonable expectations regarding some future
uses of property, like a property owner buying property in the
middle of a residential area with firm plans to build a gas station.103 Even if such plans or expectations are distinct—the property owner knows precisely what he wants to build and has
maybe even undertaken preliminary site preparation—they
might nevertheless be unreasonable.
An existing use is presumptively reasonable.104 Conceptually, however, a use that was reasonable when developed—
whether a tannery or natural gas facility—can become unreasonable over time.105 This has long been true in the law of nuisance, where a benign use can turn into a nuisance as conditions
in the world change. 106 It should be true of the law of takings as
101. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
102. See J. David Breemer, Playing the Expectations Game: When Are Investment-Backed Land Use Expectations (Un)reasonable in State Courts?, 38 URB.
LAW. 81, 85–86 (2006).
103. See, e.g., Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349–50
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (providing a framework to assess the reasonableness of an
owner ’s expectations, based largely on the probability of regulation); Mock v.
Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 623 A.2d 940, 949 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (“As to the Mocks’
future plans, we further agree . . . that the Mocks could not reasonably expect
to develop their land free from government regulation because it is riparian
land, which has been subject to regulation for centuries.”); see also John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 183–
86 (2005) (analyzing this reasonableness aspect of the Penn Central test).
104. In upholding the historic landmarking of Grand Central terminal in
Penn Central, the Court noted that the regulation did not interfere with the use
of the property as a railroad terminal—the existing use and therefore the primary investment-backed expectation of its owners. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (“[T]he New York City law does not
interfere in any way with the present uses of the Terminal. Its designation as a
landmark not only permits but contemplates that appellants may continue to
use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad
terminal containing office space and concessions. So the law does not interfere
with what must be regarded as Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning
the use of the parcel.”).
105. Cf. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705–08
(Ariz. 1972) (finding a cattle feedlot, the location of which was not originally
unreasonable, to be a nuisance given the development of a new community
nearby).
106. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D, cmt. b (AM.
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well, which increasingly incorporates a dynamic approach to defining expectations. 107 Under the Kaiser Aetna version of the
Penn Central test, natural gas infrastructure should then receive
less takings protection as the investments become unreasonable
over time.
Despite these arguments, tremendous uncertainty remains.
The specter of property protection indeed hangs over many current regulatory responses to climate change, even though our arguments about reasonable expectations should apply today as in
the future. 108 Moreover, the diminution in value prong from
Penn Central will continue to weigh heavily against the government. 109 Although regulations of natural gas facilities should not
cause a total wipeout under Lucas, they will almost certainly result in a significant diminution in value. There is no automatic
cutoff or trigger in the percentage diminution in value that will
result in takings liability, but the greater the regulatory impact,
the more likely it is to be a taking. 110 The kinds of regulatory
LAW INST. 1979) (“ The defendant is required to contemplate and expect the possibility that the adjoining land may be settled, sold or otherwise transferred and
that a condition originally harmless may result in an actionable nuisance when
there is later development.”).
107. See Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty
To Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 377–78 (identifying governments’
obligation to act in the face of changes in the world); see also District Intown
Props. Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(“[A]t the time District Intown subdivided the property, it knew, or should have
known, that the property was potentially subject to regulation under the landmark laws.”); Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding the plaintiff ’s expectations of developing wetlands to be unreasonable “[i]n
light of the growing consciousness of and sensitivity toward environmental issues”).
108. See Laurence H. Tribe & Peabody Energy Corp., Comment Letter on
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830 (June 18, 2014), 11–15 (Dec. 1,
2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602
-23587 (contending the Clean Power Plan effectuates a taking); see also Andrew
W. Schwartz, No Competing Theory of Constitutional Interpretation Justifies
Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 251 (2015) (“[T]he dramatic expansion of regulatory programs necessary to avoid environmental
harms and other social problems, in addition to facing formidable political obstacles, risks running headlong into a regulatory takings doctrine.”); Jeffrey
Dintzer & Nathaniel Johnson, Legal Risks of Fracking Bans Are Real, L.A.
DAILY J. (June 24, 2014), https://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
Documents/LegalRisksFrackingBans.pdf (examining the takings implications
of restrictions on fracking).
109. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 105–06 (1978).
110. See Mark W. Cordes, Takings Jurisprudence as Three-Tiered Review,
20 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 39 (2005) (analyzing the general percentage of diminution in value required by courts applying the Penn Central test);
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burdens we anticipate becoming necessary in the future would
significantly diminish the value of all natural gas infrastructure.
A prelude to these anticipated takings challenges can be
found in initial reactions to EPA’s Clean Power Plan, which is
now in the process of being replaced, but was directed at coalfired plants. Although less sweeping in scope than the kinds of
regulations that are likely in the future, industry was nevertheless quick to raise regulatory takings objections. In formal comments to EPA on behalf of Peabody Energy Corporation, Professor Laurence Tribe argued that the regulation effected an
impermissible taking. 111 He pointed to the significant economic
impact of the regulation, as well as the long tradition of federal
support for coal as informing the industry’s reasonable expectations. 112 Tribe’s comments evoked furious responses, and were
pilloried by other academics. In a comprehensive reply, Professors Jody Freeman and Richard Lazarus—Tribe’s colleagues at
Harvard Law School—called the argument “wholly without
merit.” 113 They argued that “there is simply no reasonable expectation to profit forever from activities that are proven to harm
public health and welfare.” 114 Even Professor Richard Epstein,
famous for his maximalist view of the Takings Clause, found
Tribe’s argument “wholly unconvincing” because “control of pollution lies at the heart of the government’s power to regulate under even the narrowest view of the takings clause.” 115
The invocation of the Takings Clause in the context of comparatively modest changes to the regulation of coal-fired power
plants presages the fights to come, however. Change the facts to
make new regulations much more restrictive and the economic
Mark W. Cordes, The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on Takings and Environmental Land Use Regulation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 383 (2003) (“Yet,
all else being equal, a substantial diminution in value might bring a regulation
closer to a Penn Central taking . . . .”); Michelman, supra note 88, at 1190–93
(“[T]he claim to compensation must grow more compelling as the disproportionate harm increases towards immensity.”).
111. See Tribe & Peabody Energy Corp., supra note 108.
112. Id. at 13–15. Tribe also argued that the rules were discriminatory in
the sense that they unfairly burdened power plants that were reliant on coal
more than those that were not. Id.
113. Jody Freeman & Richard Lazarus, Is the President’s Climate Plan Unconstitutional?, HARV. L. TODAY (Mar. 18, 2015), https://today.law.harvard.edu/
is-the-presidents-climate-plan-unconstitutional.
114. Id.
115. Richard A. Epstein, The EPA’s Clean Coal Dust-Up, HOOVER INST.: DEFINING IDEAS (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.hoover.org/research/epas-clean-coaldust.
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impact much greater, and the Tribe of the future may well find
himself with more allies, including judicial ones. We agree with
the critiques of Tribe’s particular application of the Takings
Clause, but we also suspect that the ferocity of the responses reflects an awareness of the risk of takings liability for carbon regulations. As unlikely as takings liability may be, the risk is real.
The only certainty in the constitutional protection of property is a significant measure of unpredictability. The outcome of
any takings analysis is difficult to predict, and the resolution of
the particular claims we envision here is even more so. 116 Even
though governments usually win, the nature of the ad hoc takings inquiry provides little certainty in any particular dispute. 117
Moreover, the takings analysis here is fundamentally a predictive exercise, only slightly more reliable than gazing into a crystal ball. The last fifty years have demonstrated that the substantive content of property protection can change drastically over
time. 118 What counts as a taking today may not be one tomorrow.
Or, more problematically, what would count as a regulatory safe
harbor today may be eliminated by the time that our reliance on
natural gas must come to an end. 119 So long as the possibility of
constitutional protection exists, governments in the future may
well find themselves constrained from completing the process of
decarbonizing our energy supply. This is as likely to be true for
political reasons as doctrinal ones; so long as property owners
have a colorable claim—whether or not it should win—they may
116. See J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 90–91 (1995) (“ The regulatory takings
doctrine is a pernicious mess.”); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In
Search of Underlying Principles Part I—A Critique of Current Takings Clause
Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1316–17 (1989) (declaring that it is not only
“difficult to discern . . . which test the Court [will] apply in any given case,” but
that there is also “considerable uncertainty as to what each test means”); Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1697, 1700–02 (1988) (criticizing takings jurisprudence as “judicially created uncertainty”).
117. See James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit
Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 62–68 (2016) (“[Under Penn Central,]
[e]ach case is to be examined in light of all its facts and circumstances. Essentially, ad hoc review doctrine empowers state courts to reach whatever result
they like.”).
118. Penn Central was decided in 1978. The common law nuisance exception
was created in 1992. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30
(1992) (establishing the common law nuisance exception); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
119. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 74; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024 (curtailing the harm-prevention defense “since the distinction between ‘harm-preventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’ regulation is often in the eye of the beholder ”).
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well be able to invoke considerations of justice and fairness to
influence a skittish and politically responsive government. As a
result, there are nontrivial reasons to worry that the development of natural gas infrastructure today may well lock in those
investments and make subsequent regulation more difficult,
more expensive, and potentially even impermissible. 120 Natural
gas may well turn into a bridge to nowhere if building out the
infrastructure generates property protections that discourage
adoption of adequate climate measures in the future.
B. PRESERVING FLEXIBILITY
The path that we are currently on—doing nothing today and
risking paying compensation in the future—represents an implicit bet about the need for regulatory change in the future, and
also about how courts will apply the Takings Clause to those
changes. Many political actors today appear to be betting that
future regulations will not be necessary. This attitude is consistent with a denial of the basic science of climate change, a political (or normative) calculus that costs can and should be
shifted into the future, a choice to ignore the problem altogether,
or a gamble that some technological innovation or changed understanding of the climate system will forestall the need for future regulatory intervention. We reject the first three of these
“reasons” to do nothing. We accept the basic science of climate
change, object to ignoring intergenerational concerns, and believe the need to focus on the problem is urgent. These positions
are, in fact, embedded in our assumptions in this project, and
they have received ample treatment in other work. 121
120. The typical remedy for a regulatory takings violation is damages, while
the remedy for a due process violation is injunctive relief. See Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (contrasting the remedies for takings violations and due process violations); see also Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 309–10
(2012) (“[W]here the government violates the Takings Clause, the remedy is
compensation for the period the violation is in place, but when its action deprives an owner of property without due process, compensation is not sufficient
and the government action must be invalidated.” (footnote omitted)).
121. See, e.g., Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change and Natural Gas Dynamic Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1217, 1225–31 (2013) (discussing
the potential for “path dependency” and the need for “breakout solutions”); Lincoln L. Davies & Victoria Luman, The Role of Natural Gas in the Clean Power
Plan, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 371–73 (2015) (exploring the view that reliance on natural gas could be a “dead end” rather than a bridge fuel); Patrick
Parenteau & Abigail Barnes, A Bridge Too Far: Building Off-Ramps on the
Shale Gas Superhighway, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 325, 326–29 (2013) (emphasizing
that present steps must be taken to offset the “path dependency” associated with
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We nevertheless recognize the fourth possibility: that no
dramatic regulatory interventions will be needed in the future to
decarbonize our energy supply. It is possible, for example, that
market forces will propel adoption of renewable energy, either
because costs of solar and wind energy continue to decrease substantially, or because the costs of natural gas extraction and use
go up. 122 It is also possible that technological innovations, like
CCS, will turn out to be both efficacious and inexpensive, and
that regulatory burdens associated with them will not be too onerous. 123 But these possibilities, while conceivable, seem unlikely. Markets are difficult to predict, but, as we argued above,
the economics of natural gas make it likely to remain relatively
inexpensive and therefore ubiquitous for a long time—even if
adoption of renewable energy increases dramatically.124 Furthermore, planet scientists characterize technological solutions
like CCS as a kind of Hail Mary pass, posing enormous risks and
viewed as a last-ditch effort at best. 125
natural gas).
122. See, e.g., Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, Using the Market To Address Climate Change: Insights from Theory & Experience, DAEDALUS, Spring
2012, at 45, 46–47 (“[R]eal-world experience demonstrates the power of markets
to drive changes in the investment and use of emission-intensive technologies.”);
Jim Murphy, Tipping Points: Carbon Rule Can Spur Clean Energy, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2015, at 52, 53 (“[A] shift is clearly occurring as market forces and more competitive prices are leading to a rapid increase in renewable energy growth.”). But see Thomas Joo, Global Warming and the
Management-Centered Corporation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 693 (2009)
(“Market forces and shareholder empowerment will . . . be woefully insufficient
to make corporations reduce carbon emissions unless regulation reduces the
profitability of carbon-intensive business activity through taxes, fines, and the
like, and/or by reducing the relative costs of cleaner technology through tax
breaks or direct subsidies.”); Lonnie G. Thompson, Abrupt Climate Changes:
Past, Present and Future, J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 101, 105–06 (2007)
(“Market forces alone will not produce the big switch in energy resources that
is required if we are going to significantly reduce our carbon dioxide emissions.”).
123. See Howard Herzog et al., Cost and Economic Potential, in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE 339, 339–62 (Bert
Metz et al. eds., 2005) (studying the potential for CCS to cost-effectively reduce
greenhouse gas emissions). See generally Victor B. Flatt, Paving the Legal Path
for Carbon Sequestration from Coal, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 211 (2009)
(examining legal obstacles to CCS); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson,
Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration: Assessing a Liability for Long-Term
Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.J. 103 (2008) (addressing potential liability from storing sequestered carbon dioxide and considering various liability
options moving forward).
124. See supra Part I.A.
125. See, e.g., Christine Ehlig-Economides & Michael J. Economides, Sequestering Carbon Dioxide in a Closed Underground Volume, 70 J. PETROLEUM SCI.
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If regulatory responses are required, courts in the future
may give broad constitutional latitude to new regulations, as described in the previous section.126 Notice, however, that there are
parties on either side of that bet. The government may be gambling that it will be free to act in the future, while the natural
gas industry will be gambling on the opposite. Or, more precisely, the natural gas industry may be gambling that it will
have sufficient political power in the future to prevent regulatory
change in the first place, with the prospect of takings-based compensation serving as a kind of alternative safety net in the event
of new regulations.
This is a complex calculus on both sides, and small shifts in
the ex ante probability of losing a takings claim will have a significant impact on the expected cost of a regulation. 127 Where the
economic stakes are in the billions of dollars, a change of even a
few percentage points in the likelihood of liability will have an
impact in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and make regulation either more or less likely. Moreover, government actors are
sensitive—perhaps overly so—to legitimate-seeming claims of
property owners. 128 Whether or not takings protection would ultimately apply, perceptions of fairness and illegality affect the
political calculus.129 The presence of serious constitutional
& ENGINEERING 123 (2009) (reporting on the impractically vast space necessary
to store sequestered carbon dioxide); Gary Shaffer, Long-Term Effectiveness and
Consequences of Carbon Dioxide Sequestration, 3 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 464
(2010) (questioning the long-term efficacy of CCS).
126. See supra Part II.A.
127. See Christopher Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
75, 78–79 (2016) (“[A] risk averse government may choose not to enact beneficial
land use regulations . . . that create a risk of litigation, even if the likelihood of
liability is remote, and even if the expected value of the regulation is strongly
positive.”).
128. Cf. David Dana, Incentivizing Municipalities To Adapt to Climate
Change: Takings Liability and FEMA Reform as Possible Solutions, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 281, 295 (2016) (“It is . . . arguable that local governments are
not only sensitive to potential Takings Clause liabilities, but risk averse with
respect to such potential liabilities.”); Serkin, supra note 127, at 110–14 (contemplating the effects of takings claims on risk-averse government actors);
Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments
and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1666–70 (2006) (discussing the
risk aversion of local governments).
129. Fairness considerations also affect the doctrinal analysis. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 46–49 (1960) (“ The Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just
compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.”).
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claims makes the government less likely to regulate. Actions today that (1) reduce the likelihood of valid takings claims; and (2)
that defang claims that regulations are unfair and unconstitutional will therefore have an impact on future regulatory incentives, both by affecting the anticipated costs of takings litigation
and liability and by changing the politics.
Continuing on the current path therefore comes with significant risks. It raises the distinct possibility that the natural gas
infrastructure will become entrenched against adverse regulatory changes, either legally or politically, even though there is
widespread acknowledgement today that those regulatory
changes will be necessary in several decades. Ultimately, we remain concerned that regulations will be necessary in the future
and that the threat of legal protections will overly constrain regulatory responses. In the face of uncertainty, it is important to
lay the legal groundwork to preserve policy flexibility in the future.
III. PREVENTING TAKINGS CLAIMS
When the legal system looks backwards, it sees the investments people have already made in reliance on legal rules, and
generally seeks to protect those settled expectations. 130 What we
propose, however, is a set of tools to require the legal system to
look forward. By building limitations into legal entitlements ex
ante, it will be easier ex post to find that any additional reliance
was unreasonable. The challenge, at the most general level, is to
shift the temporal perspective of property rights and regulation,
and to act now to preserve policy flexibility in the future.131 We
argue that developing a record establishing the reasonable expectations regarding the lifespan of the natural gas industry will
limit or eliminate takings liability. This should be relatively easy
to accomplish today and requires little or no political intervention. We advocate for that approach as low-hanging fruit. But, in
addition, we also propose a new regulatory tool to accomplish
130. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1084–87 (1997) (describing the relevance of
settled expectations and reliance interests in assessing the desirability of retroactive laws).
131. By some measure, we are accepting the challenge to focus ahead of time
on regulatory exit when designing current regulatory strategy. See J.B. Ruhl &
James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1296–99 (2015) (“Government should also ask how it will exit when it realizes it (1) has accomplished
Goal X, (2) is not achieving Goal X, or (3) has regulated more than necessary to
achieve Goal X.”).

2018]

PROSPECTIVE GRANDFATHERING

1051

this temporal shift: prospective grandfathering. It relies, fundamentally, on important limits on the legal protection of existing
uses found in land use law. We consider these in turn.
A. SETTING REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
As we described above, the Takings Clause does not protect
all expectations that a property owner might have, nor even all
investment-backed expectations. Instead, the Takings Clause
protects only reasonable investment-backed expectations. 132
That is a substantial limitation when it comes to natural gas.
Although it is reasonable to invest in natural gas infrastructure
today—indeed, it is imperative—expectations regarding those
investments should be temporally limited. Natural gas companies and their investors should expect future regulatory action,
and those expectations should inform any subsequent takings
litigation.
Doctrinally, the reasonableness of expectations can be affected by the foreseeability of future adverse regulatory changes.
In Kafka v. Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, the
Montana Supreme Court rejected a takings claim arising out of
Montana’s decision to prohibit game-farm operators from charging a fee to shoot exotic big game species. 133 Plaintiffs owned a
game-farm ranch where the business model involved raising exotic animals for hunters to pay to shoot. 134 They alleged that the
new regulation was a taking of their property. In rejecting the
challenge, the Montana Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiffs
should have known their industry was controversial and there
was a likelihood it would be significantly regulated. 135 Therefore,
the plaintiffs could not have reasonable investment-backed expectations in their ongoing use of their property as a game
farm. 136 Not every regulatory change is reasonably foreseeable,
132. See supra text accompanying notes 102–07.
133. Kafka v. Mont. Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 12–13 (Mont.
2008).
134. Id.
135. See id. at 32 (“[S]ince appellants could have reasonably anticipated the
complete elimination of Game Farms by the State or regulations that would
make participation in the field unprofitable, they should have also anticipated
that the State could make the operations less profitable by eliminating the instate market for fee-shooting.”).
136. See id. (“[A]ppellants could not maintain a reasonable investmentbacked expectation that they would be permanently insulated against the possibility that the Game Farm industry would be either regulated so as to eliminate its profitability, or completely abolished.”).
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of course. And “the mere fact that a business operates in even a
highly-regulated industry does not mean that all regulatory
changes are reasonably foreseeable nor that the business cannot
have reasonable investment-backed expectations.” 137 Nevertheless, courts generally examine whether future regulations were
foreseeable when evaluating the extent of investment-backed expectations, and do not focus exclusively on the existing regulatory regime. 138
In light of this attention to property owners’ objective expectations ex ante, it is possible to preserve future regulatory authority by establishing an adequate record today of the regulatory lifespan of the natural gas industry. Information can have
powerful legal consequences, an insight that has not been lost on
public and private environmental policymakers over the last several decades. Consider, for example, the use of deed notices and
deed restrictions. This approach has been used to limit future
uses of contaminated sites under both the federal Superfund
statute and its state analogues. 139 A site that will only be used
as a landfill or a factory may not need to be cleaned up to the
level that would be necessary if the site could be used as a school.
Federal and state policymakers have responded by adopting policies that allow the cleanup standards to be determined based on
the likely uses of the property, and to constrain those uses by
placing information and restrictions in the property record regarding the site.140
137. Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 514 (2009) (citing
Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
138. See, e.g., Arctic King Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 360,
385 (2004) (“[K]nowing that Congress likely would eventually address the overcapitalization problem [in the fishing industry], plaintiff risked that it could
cease actively participating in the fishery and yet still receive [a benefit] under
whatever regulatory regime was ultimately adopted to effectuate a decapitalization. Things did not work as planned and plaintiff was excluded . . . not because the Congress failed to act in a reasonably foreseeable fashion, but because
plaintiff miscalculated.”); Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 268 (2001)
(“Because the market can anticipate regulatory developments, it follows that
reasonable expectations may extend beyond legal restrictions already in place
and encompass the foreseeable creation of a new regulatory program or the expansion of an existing program.”), aff ’d, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
139. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (2012) (imposing deed notice and restriction requirements when federally owned sites are transferred); Industrial Site Recovery
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10B-13a(2) (West 2015) (instituting deed notice requirements in certain situations).
140. See, e.g., EPA, EPA-540-R-09-001, INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS: A GUIDE
TO PLANNING, IMPLEMENTING, MAINTAINING AND ENFORCING INSTITUTIONAL
CONTROLS AT CONTAMINATED SITES 17 (2012), https://www.epa.gov/sites/

2018]

PROSPECTIVE GRANDFATHERING

1053

Many types of public actions along these lines are possible.
Regulators and other scientific bodies have already developed
the research base necessary to create a reasonable expectation
that the end of the natural gas bridge will occur by 2050. The
five assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), promulgated over the last twenty-five
years, present ever starker warnings about anthropogenic climate change and the need for carbon limits.141 Domestic regulatory agencies also have produced reports that provide information about climate change and carbon limits. 142 To reduce
uncertainty in the record, regulators could draw from options
such as a clear statement of long-term prospective regulatory actions in annual regulatory agendas, preambles to legislation and
regulations, permits, and deed notices for the land on which natural gas facilities are built. These are just examples of available
options.
Although public policymakers may not have the legal or political support necessary to act, private actors also have used information in ways that could address the end-of-bridge problem.
For instance, in 1987, the Environmental Defense Fund used information to change the incentives and legal risks facing municipal waste incinerator operators. 143 At the time, municipal waste
incinerator operators were treating incinerator ash as nonhazardous, based on a federal regulatory provision that allowed
production/files/documents/final_pime_guidance_december_2012.pdf (providing guidance on use of deed notices and restrictions). Of course, like all regulatory instruments, these are imperfect. The deed transferring what became the
Love Canal Superfund site from Hooker Chemicals to the Niagara School District stated that “[p]rior to the delivery of this instrument of conveyance, the
grantee herein has been advised by the grantor that the premises above described have been filled, in whole or in part, to the present grade level thereof
with waste products resulting from the manufacturing of chemicals by the grantor at its plant . . . and the grantee assumes all risk and liability incident to the
use thereof.” United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 722 F. Supp.
960, 962 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
141. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Thomas F. Stocker et al.
eds., 2013), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WGIAR5_
SPM_brochure_en.pdf.
142. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE
ACTION PLAN (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf (advancing various policy initiatives
related to climate change adaptation and mitigation).
143. The municipal incinerator waste litigation ended with City of Chicago
v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994), and is discussed in ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 389–91 (7th ed. 2013).
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them, in the absence of data, to “apply[] knowledge” of a waste
stream “in light of the materials or the processes used” to determine whether it must be treated as hazardous. 144 To reduce
treatment costs, operators were assuming the waste was not
hazardous and were sending it to landfills. Combined with lobbying and litigation efforts, the Environmental Defense Fund
took the novel step of testing some waste streams, finding them
to be hazardous, and sending that information, by registered
mail, to waste incinerator operators nationwide.145 By destroying the ability to rely on a lack of knowledge about the potentially hazardous nature of the waste, the information shifted the
incentives of the incinerator operators even in the absence of
statutory or regulatory change.
An initiative that distributes information about the expected lifespan of natural-gas-fired electric plants could have a
similar effect here. Environmental groups could play a leading
role by collecting and disseminating studies and authoring reports detailing the limits of long-term reliance on natural gas.
Broad dissemination to corporate managers, investors, regulators, and the public will make it difficult for industry in the future to disclaim knowledge. At the very least, the expert studies
cited in this Article and other studies discussing the need to treat
natural gas as a bridge fuel will create a record of the reasonableness of investment-backed expectations that can be used in
takings litigation in the future.146 Regulators will be able to
point back to this record evidence that investors in natural gas
knew, or should have known, that their investments would only
pay out for approximately thirty years, at which point the regulatory environment would be likely to change.
In addition to the advocacy group initiatives we discussed
above, several other private options are available to address this
problem.147 For one, banks and other institutional investors
have an important role to play. Already, many forward-looking
financial institutions recognize the disruptive potential of future
144. 40 C.F.R. § 262.11 (c)(2) (2017).
145. For a discussion of the Environmental Defense Fund’s letter to municipal incinerator operators, see Elmer W. Lammi, Environmental Group Warns
Trash Being Turned into Toxic Waste, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Mar. 12, 1987),
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/03/12/Environmental-group-warns-trash
-being-turned-into-toxic-waste/7669542523600.
146. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (citing articles discussing
natural gas as a bridge fuel).
147. For a discussion of private regulatory instruments, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (2013).
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carbon regulations and require borrowers to analyze and disclose
how their investments will fare under a different regulatory regime. 148 In fact, in 2008, a group of major banks signaled the
expectations of the leaders in the financial sector by adopting the
carbon principles, a set of private guidelines that require prospective borrowers for fossil-fuel-fired power plants to account
for climate change regulations when conducting due diligence. 149
The carbon principles signaled to potential borrowers the need
to account for regulatory limits on fossil fuel carbon emissions
when applying for loans to finance new fossil-fuel-fired electric
plants, and the principles could be updated to require borrowers
to commit not to run plants after 2040 or 2050. If the banks and
investors financing natural gas electric generating infrastructure are assuming some significant risk of regulation—which the
studies discussed in Part I.A suggest may result in the nonviability of carbon-emitting energy by 2050—then those assumptions should again inform takings analysis in the future. The
challenge today is to build and maintain an adequate record—
such as those developed through the enhanced diligence and disclosure required by the carbon principles—and to understand
how those financial assumptions may be an important tool to
preserve regulatory flexibility.
Admittedly, there is a circularity to this claim. It implies
that investors could help to immunize their investments in natural gas infrastructure by willfully ignoring the risk of future
regulation. That circularity is actually inherent in the focus on
investment-backed expectations and in takings analysis today.150 Other scholars have identified the possibility that a property owner can bootstrap a regulatory takings claim by overpaying for property subject to regulation, because the purchase price
148. See MORGAN STANLEY, THE CARBON PRINCIPLES: FOSSIL FUEL GENERFINANCING ENHANCED ENVIRONMENTAL DILIGENCE PROCESS 6–7 (n.d.),
https://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/files//1500519_carbon_principles_
diligence_2.pdf.
149. See Vandenbergh & Gilligan, supra note 68, at 266–67 (discussing the
carbon principles).
150. This same dynamic arises in the very different context of the Fourth
Amendment, which focuses on the “reasonable expectation of privacy,” but with
more equivocal results. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 n.5
(1979) (“[I]f the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes . . . . In such circumstances . . . those subjective
expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection was.”). We thank Christopher Slobogin
for bringing this issue to our attention.
ATION
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is evidence of investment-backed expectations. 151 Precisely the
same problem arises here. This is a problem in theory, but not in
practice. Investors will not ignore genuine risks so as to marginally increase the merits of regulatory takings claims if those
risks come to pass. Takings liability remains unlikely, and will
not fully protect investors in any case. And, fundamentally, the
Takings Clause only protects reasonable expectations. Ignoring
foreseeable risks does not make an investment reasonable.
Our argument is that courts in the future will look back at
the information that was readily available to power plant and
other investors today when the courts evaluate the reasonableness of expectations for investments in natural-gas-fired electricity plants and related infrastructure, and public and private
policymakers today have an opportunity to reduce the uncertainty in the record. Decades from now, faced with a takings
claim, governments will be able to point back to this record as
evidence that it was unreasonable to expect that natural gas
would remain viable indefinitely. And the more attention this
issue receives, the greater the impact on reasonable expectations.
B. PROSPECTIVE GRANDFATHERING
The advantage of information disclosure to establish reasonable investment-backed expectations is its relative ease. Given
the public and private options, it also requires little or no political will, or even government action, to build a record that will
help to immunize future regulators from regulatory takings
claims. But information disclosure is not particularly strong
medicine. The NSR debate discussed above demonstrates the difficulty of establishing the state of knowledge that prevailed several decades earlier, particularly when creating ambiguity about
that state of knowledge can affect billions of dollars. 152
It is therefore important to consider a stronger approach
available to government actors today to preserve regulatory flexibility in the future—what we dub prospective grandfathering.

151. See, e.g., Mandelker, supra note 97, at 247 n.126 (“A landowner may
overpay for land knowing he has a chance at compensation if his expectations
for development of the land are not realized.”); Lynda J. Oswald, Concerning the
Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 121 (1995) (objecting to use of the purchase
price to evaluate landowner expectations on account of this concern).
152. See supra Part I.A.
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Understanding how it works, and the extent of its promise, requires first examining an important tool in land use law for eliminating in-place investments: amortization of prior existing uses
of property.
1. Amortization

Both the Constitution and statutory law provide extremely
robust protection for existing uses of property. 153 It is not surprising, then, that zoning and land use regulations are usually
prospective only; they grandfather developed property as prior
nonconforming uses.154 The persistence of prior nonconforming
uses can interfere with rational land use objectives, however,
leading governments to adopt a variety of responses to address
them. At one end of the spectrum, governments sometimes use
eminent domain to take title to problematic nonconforming
uses. 155 At the opposite end of the spectrum—following the lead
of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act—governments adopt what
amounts to a natural-death approach; they constrain the extent
to which prior nonconforming uses can be improved or rebuilt
(and sometimes even maintained), but otherwise wait for them
to die out. 156
Some states and local governments have adopted an intermediate alternative for eliminating prior nonconforming land
uses. Instead of relying on either condemnation or on natural
obsolescence, they have instead opted for the land use tool of
amortization. Amortization in this context amounts to allowing
a prior nonconforming use to remain in place for some predetermined amount of time before having to conform to the regulatory
153. See Serkin, supra note 19, at 1232, 1242 (referring to statutory and constitutional protections, respectively).
154. Indeed, in the context of land use controls, the original 1926 Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) recognized that “the almost universal practice is to make zoning ordinances nonretroactive.” U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT 2
(1926). The difference between prospective and retroactive regulations in the
context of land use regulations is surprisingly fraught. See Fisch, supra note
130, at 1067–69; Serkin, supra note 19, at 1263.
155. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 476 (2005) (taking
developed land by eminent domain is acceptable when it serves a public purpose).
156. See Serkin, supra note 19, at 1235–36 (citing Eunice A. Eichelberger,
Alteration, Extension, Reconstruction, or Repair of Nonconforming Structure or
Structure Devoted to Nonconforming Use as Violation of Zoning Ordinance,
63 A.L.R. 4th 275 (1988)) (noting the variety of rules governments have implemented to encourage the demise of non-conforming uses).
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change. 157 For example, when enacting new zoning prohibitions
on adult uses or billboards (two common targets of amortization),
the zoning ordinance may require property owners to come into
compliance with new zoning regulations after, say, two years. 158
By giving this limited period of grandfathering, the government
can then compel removal of the preexisting use without paying
any explicit compensation.
Both the use of amortization and the duration of the amortization period are subject to constitutional limits. Although the
source of protection is contested, courts typically review amortization under the Takings Clause. 159 Courts in some states have
prohibited the practice outright. They have reasoned that if a
regulation would be a taking today, it would still be a taking at
the end of the amortization period. 160 Most courts, however, have
upheld amortization under the Takings Clause. Of those, some
have reasoned that the amortization provision is itself a kind of
implicit compensation that satisfies the Fifth Amendment’s just
compensation requirement. 161 In other words, prohibiting the
157. See Serkin, supra note 19, at 1236–37 (describing amortization).
158. See, e.g., Indep. News, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 568 F.3d 148, 151 (4th
Cir. 2009) (zoning ordinance compliance for adult use for eight years); World
Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004)
(zoning ordinance compliance for adult use for one year); David Vincent, Inc. v.
Broward Cty., 200 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 2000) (zoning ordinance compliance for adult use for five years); Adams Outdoor Advert., LP. v. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 909 A.2d 469, 473 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (zoning ordiance compliance for
billboards for thirty days); cf. PA Nw. Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584
A.2d 1372, 1378 (Pa. 1991) (finding ninety days too short for an adult book
store).
159. See Serkin, supra note 19, at 1244–45 (noting that the majority of courts
uphold amortization statutes through a takings analysis). Some courts view
amortization through the lens of due process, asking, in essence, whether the
benefits of amortization to the public outweigh the costs to the property owner.
Id. at 1243–44. Courts in many states have upheld the use of amortization, at
least in principle. But the sufficiency of the amortization period is then subject
to its own due process review. The greater the capital investments, the longer
the amortization period needs to be. See Margaret Collins, Methods of Determining Amortization Periods for Non-Conforming Uses, 3 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y
215, 218–20 (2000) (describing how to calculate amortization periods for recoverable costs).
160. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745, 753 (Mo. 1965) (“[I]t
would be a strange . . . doctrine indeed [to approve a taking simply if it] was not
too soon.”); see also John H. Clifton, Comment, Amortization of Nonconforming
Uses in Pennsylvania: A Possible Remedy for a Zoning Headache, 79 DICK. L.
REV. 235, 244 (1975) (characterizing Hoffman as holding that “[a] delayed taking of private property for public use without just compensation was still unconstitutional”).
161. Serkin, supra note 19, at 1244.
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existing use is, in fact, a taking that requires compensation, but
the form of payment is the permission to remain in place for long
enough to obtain a reasonable return on the investment.
Other courts, however, have viewed the amortization period
as a kind of reciprocal benefit analogous to the transferable development rights (TDRs) in Penn Central; amortization blunts
the impact of the regulatory burden by enough to prevent the
regulation from effecting a taking in the first place. 162 As the
time horizon for regulatory compliance increases, the present
value of the regulatory impact decreases. A regulation that
grandfathers an existing use for a hundred years, for example,
will have very little impact on the value of the property today,
while a two-year amortization period will have a much more significant effect. In other words, requiring regulatory compliance
in the future will affect the value of the resource today, but the
extent of the diminution in the present value of the property will
depend on the duration of the amortization period. Applying traditional Penn Central takings analysis, amortization should be
permissible so long as the amortization period is long enough
that the regulation neither (1) reduces the present value of the
property by too much; nor (2) interferes too much with reasonable investment-backed expectations. If a property owner is given
long enough before coming into compliance, the regulation will
have no meaningful impact on present value or on reasonable
expectations.
Of course, zoning and land use regulations will not be the
specific regulatory tools used to eliminate natural gas infrastructure in the future. Nevertheless, the same dynamics are at play.
In-place investments—whether billboards or pipelines—represent crystalized expectations about the use of property. If courts
find that they cannot be eliminated outright without violating
the Takings Clause, the same range of regulatory options should
be available.
Both eminent domain and natural obsolescence are problematic in the context of natural gas. Eminent domain is very
expensive. If the federal government were to seek to condemn
natural gas facilities, the price tag would likely run into the billions of dollars. 163 Indeed, our effort here to avoid regulatory takings liability is based on the assumption that governments in the
162. For discussion of the TDRs in Penn Central, and how they prevented
the landmarking of Grand Central from effecting a taking, see generally Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (2016).
163. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Appendix B: Natural Gas, in QUADRENNIAL
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future will underregulate carbon emissions if forced to pay compensation. Natural obsolescence has its own well-known problems: many prior nonconforming uses are especially valuable
precisely because they are nonconforming.164 They will not die a
natural death because the regulatory regime has granted them
a kind of minimonopoly—the only bodega in a residential area,
the only gas station in a retail area, and so forth. 165 The same is
true in the context of power plants, as the Clean Air Act NSR
debate demonstrated. 166 As we discussed in Part I.A, the end of
the natural gas bridge has strong parallels with the Clean Air
Act NSR experience regarding coal-fired power plants and other
large sources of air pollution. Disagreements remain about how
EPA should have treated modifications to grandfathered coalfired power plants that enabled them to run for decades after
non-modified plants would have closed. Whether the Clinton or
Bush Administrations took the appropriate regulatory response,
the dynamic is clear enough: uses that are exempt from new regulations can become especially valuable precisely because of
their grandfathered status. 167 We predict that the same will be
true of natural gas facilities.
Amortization is a more promising middle path. It would accelerate the obsolescence of natural gas infrastructure without
ENERGY REVIEW: ENERGY TRANSMISSION, STORAGE, AND DISTRIBUTION INFRASTRUCTURE, at NG-5 (2015), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/07/f24/

QER_Appendix%20B_NaturalGas.pdf (stating that “[f]rom 2004 to 2014, companies made $10 billion in average annual investments in midstream natural
gas infrastructure, including major pipeline projects,” to support increasing demand); see also supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
164. See City of Los Angeles v. A.I. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 40 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1954) (“Until recently zoning ordinances have made no provision for any systematic and comprehensive elimination of the nonconforming use. The expectation seems to have been that existing nonconforming uses would be of little consequence and that they would eventually disappear. The contrary appears to be
the case.” (internal citations omitted)); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonableness of Amortization Periods for Nonconforming Uses—Balancing the Private
Interest and the Public Welfare, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 99, 109
(1988) (“[N]onconforming uses thrived due to the protection from new competition given them by the zoning laws.”).
165. See Eric J. Strauss & Mary M. Giese, Elimination of Nonconformities:
The Case of Voluntary Discontinuance, 25 URB. LAW. 159, 163 (1993) (“Unfortunately, nonconforming uses were not phased out because the restriction on the
development of similar uses in the area created a virtual monopoly, which allowed the nonconforming use to flourish.”).
166. See supra Part I.A.
167. See REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 48, at 5 (“Once grandfathered, [as
with the Clean Air Act,] lobbyists . . . work to preserve and enhance their legally
created advantage.”).
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forcing the government to pay monetary compensation. Amortization is traditionally a forward-looking doctrine, however, and
is triggered by the date of the new regulation and not by the date
the offending use was originally developed. The necessary amortization period for adult uses in a zoning ordinance will be the
same whether the targeted business had been in place for six
months, six years, or six decades before the zoning change. 168
Regulators of natural gas in the future will not be able to point
to the previous decades as an amortization period unless something is done today—or soon—to start the period running. What
we propose, then, is a kind of prospective grandfathering, where
utilities are put on notice that they will need to come into compliance with anticipated future regulations and that the decades
in the interim will count for purposes of amortization. Specifically, we advocate for a form of advance notice of future regulation—what has been dubbed a sunrise law or regulation in other
contexts 169—implemented through a prospective ban or, perhaps, through expedited cost recovery by state regulators.
2. Sunrise Provisions and Prospective Grandfathering for
Natural Gas
In land use and zoning law, the mechanism for triggering an
amortization period is to prohibit the use prospectively while allowing some amount of time for existing uses to come into compliance with the prohibition. This is entirely inappropriate for
natural gas. Instead of encouraging the rapid deployment of natural gas, this approach would bring it to a screeching halt. As we
said at the outset, it is important to embrace the conversion to
natural gas, at least in the short and medium term. 170 There is
no reason, however, that the doctrine of amortization needs to be
coupled with a prospective prohibition. Instead, the delayed implementation of a prohibition will have the same effect. 171 What
168. See Serkin, supra note 19, at 1237 (explaining that courts weigh present
harm to property owners against public benefit to determine the amortization
period).
169. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 561 (2007) (describing anticipatory legislation);
see also Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note 24 (suggesting a framework for sunrise legislation).
170. See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text.
171. There is one important limitation to our proposal. We envision that investments in natural gas will continue to be made, and should continue to be
made, for at least another two decades. After that, however, additional investments might not be sufficiently amortized before new regulations need to be
imposed. As a result, for the proposals considered below, we imagine a staged
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we therefore propose is, in effect, a ban on natural-gas-fired electric generating plants that is adopted now, but that does not apply until approximately 2050.
This is not as unorthodox as it might seem. Many laws and
regulations come with timing rules. 172 Most familiar, of course,
are sunset provisions that cause the subject legislation or regulation “to expire by its own terms.” 173 From tax rules, to the federal assault weapon ban, Congress frequently relies on sunset
provisions to control the temporal reach of its laws. 174 What we
propose is, in a sense, the inverse. Previously explored in the
context of constitution-making, a sunrise rule is the formal announcement of future legislation or regulation, following the absence of one.175
In fact, such sunrise rulemaking is consistent with the oldest forms of congressional delegations of regulatory authority. In
exploring the nondelegation principle in administrative law,
Professor Kevin Stack has identified its origins in a “contingency
theory of delegation.” 176 Early examples from the end of the nineteenth century involved congressional delegations to the executive “on a finding that a ‘named contingency’ had occurred.” 177
These included, for example, the power to impose tariffs if the
President determined that “tariff-free trade with [a] country
would be ‘reciprocally unequal and unreasonable.’” 178 In other
words, early congressional delegations of authority to the executive were often framed as advance notice of executive action in
the event that certain contingencies were met.
Contemporary examples of sunrise provisions are easy to
adoption, where the prospective grandfathering is announced at T1, a prospective ban is announced at T2, and new regulations are enforced against all natural gas facilities at T3. So long as the time between T2 and T3 is adequate for
amortization purposes, there should be no takings problem at T3.
172. Professors Gersen and Posner explored a variety of timing issues in
both statutory and constitutional contexts, and labeled rules with deferred implementation “delay rules.” Gersen & Posner, supra note 169, at 565.
173. Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1009
n.4 (2011). For a useful catalogue of the history of sunset rules, see Gersen &
Posner, supra note 169, at 562 n.78.
174. See Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note 24, at 1982 (collecting examples
of sunset provisions).
175. See AMAR, supra note 24, at 474–75 (discussing sunrise provisions as a
way to effect constitutional change); Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note 24, at
1979 (noting, further, the utility of sunrise provisions); see also supra note 172.
176. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE
L.J. 952, 983 (2007).
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892)).
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find. In fact, they are much more common than their more discussed inverse, sunset provisions. Whenever a rule contains a
future implementation or phase-in date, it contains a kind of
sunrise. 179 Perhaps the best-known example is EPA’s phasedown of lead in gasoline, which the agency implemented in a series of steps during the 1980s. 180 But there are many other examples, as well.
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards currently include some of the longest prospective rules in the United
States. 181 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) and EPA set the standards for vehicle fuel efficiency
and emissions, respectively. 182 The agencies gather input from
various stakeholders to create the National Program for implementing the standards, which are announced many years in advance.183 For example, Phase I of the National Program applied
to model years 2012 through 2016, while Phase II applies to
179. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 305.13 (2017) (phasing in a ceiling fan labeling
regulation over the course of two years); Prepaid Accounts under the Electronic
Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z),
CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0031, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/
20161005_cfpb_Final_Rule_Prepaid_Accounts.pdf (delaying regulatory requirements for two years).
180. See EPA History: Lead, EPA https://www.epa.gov/history/epa-history
-lead (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (listing the press releases associated with the
phases).
181. See A Brief History of U.S. Fuel Efficiency Standards, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS [hereinafter CAFE History], http://www.ucsusa.org/clean
-vehicles/fuel-efficiency/fuel-economy-basics.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018)
(explaining that 1975 legislation set standards for ten years and the 2007 legislation proscribed standards through 2030). Most agencies enact rules with effective dates within mere months, and even those rules with a longer timeframe
tend to fall within the two-year range. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 305.13 (2017) (allowing two years to comply with the Federal Trade Commission’s labeling
rules); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, 1026 (2017) (allowing two years to
comply with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s due diligence rules).
182. See 49 C.F.R. § 533.5 tbl.IV (2003) (setting mpg standards for light
truck model years 2005 (21.0 mpg), 2006 (21.6 mpg) and 2007 (22.2)). See generally 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,854
(proposed Dec. 1, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R.
§§ 523, 531, 533, 536, 537) [hereinafter Proposed Phase II] (containing the
NHTSA’s and EPA’s joint proposed National Program for model years 2017
through 2025 of cars, trucks, SUVs, and other vehicles).
183. CAFE History, supra note 181 (relating how “the Federal Government,
state regulators, and the auto industry established a national program to implement [the] first meaningful fuel efficiency improvements in over 30 years”);
see also Proposed Phase II, supra note 182, at 74,854–56, 74,862–65 (inviting
comments from industry stakeholders and discussing stakeholder involvement
in developing the program).
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model years 2017 and beyond. 184 The fleet standards generally
increase steadily, but leave room for changes in later years. 185
Similarly, the Financial Accounting Standards Board consistently and intentionally enacts rules with long compliance
timeframes.186 And other agencies have delayed implementation
of new rules in one-off situations to address specific challenges.
For example, the phasing out of incandescent light bulbs and the
conversion to high-definition television broadcasts both came
with significant lead time. 187 In both cases, Congress ended up
delaying implementation of the law even further in the face of
industry resistance, but the changes did ultimately occur.188 Internationally, too, Germany enacted a ban on the internal combustion engine in cars, effective in 2030. 189
184. Corporate Average Fuel Economy, NHTSA, http://www.nhtsa.gov/laws
-regulations/corporate-average-fuel-economy (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). The
statutes guide the contents and timing of the rules implemented by the agency;
NHTSA, for example, must consider “technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other standards of the Government on fuel economy, and
the need of the nation to conserve energy” in its rulemaking. Proposed Phase II,
supra note 182, at 74,897.
185. See 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(2)(B)–(C) (2012) (explaining that the CAFE
standards should increase ratably through 2020 and then should be set at the
maximum feasible standards); Proposed Phase II, supra note 182, at 74,861
(“NHTSA has a statutory obligation to conduct a separate de novo rulemaking
in order to establish final standards for vehicles for the 2022–2025 model
years.”).
186. See Accounting Standards Updates—Effective Dates, FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=
1218220137102 (last updated Aug. 2017) (listing effective dates up to five
years); see also Mary Clare Jalonik, FDA Punts Calorie Labels on Menus for
Another Year—Again, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/
news/politics/articles/2016-03-28/looking-for-calorie-labels-on-menus-not-until
-2017 (noting that despite issuance in 2014, the FDA continues to delay enforcement of menu guidelines due to industry pushback).
187. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110140, 121 Stat. 1492, 1580 (2007) (setting a deadline for rulemaking for incandescent lamp wattage by 2020); Carriage of Dig. Television Broad. Signals:
Amendment to Part 76 of the Comm’n’s Rules, 27 FCC Rcd. 1713, 1713 (2012)
[hereinafter HDTV Carriage Rulemaking] (explaining the initial three-year exemption period).
188. See Better Use of Light Bulbs Act, H.R. 2417, 112th Cong. (2011) (attempting to repeal parts of the 2007 act); HDTV Carriage Rulemaking, supra
note 187, at 1734 (describing steps taken to accommodate the economic impact
on small businesses).
189. See Bertel Schmitt, Germany’s Bundesrat Resolves End of Internal
Combustion Engine, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bertelschmitt/2016/10/08/germanys-bundesrat-resolves-end-of-internal
-combustion-engine. Similarly, France has announced a similar ban, to take effect in 2040. See Angelique Chrisafis & Adam Vaughan, France To Ban Sales of
Petrol and Diesel Cars by 2040, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2017), https://www
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These kinds of sunrise provisions are routine. There has
been little scholarly work describing or characterizing them, and
the justifications seem self-evident. By and large, regulators delay implementation of rules to allow industry time to develop
and deploy the technology necessary to meet the new standards.
But our proposal is different. Our goal is not to give industry
time to catch up, but rather to give it time to wind down. We offer
sunrise rules as a way of easing the legal transition between the
current policy encouraging natural gas, and our expectation of
an eventual ban.
Conceptually, adopting new carbon limits for natural-gasfired power plants to be implemented at a date far in the future
should create immunity from takings liability. Ideally, the rule
we propose would include a specific provision setting forth the
amortization schedule for natural gas investments, a schedule
that could even be implemented through expedited cost recovery
and accelerated depreciation by ratemakers, described below. 190
The interim period—the years before the new regulations come
into effect—will then count as an explicit amortization period.
Investors will be on notice that they have approximately thirty
years to recoup their investments, and cannot complain when
new carbon limits are ultimately implemented.
Even in the absence of an explicit trigger, sunrise rules
should create de facto amortization. Whether grandfathering
happens retroactively, as is typical, or prospectively, as we propose, the effect on investors is precisely the same. It should not
matter whether the amortization period is triggered by a new
prohibition coupled with a temporary reprieve to come into compliance, or by advanced notice of a future prohibition coupled
with a reprieve in the interim. In either case, investors are given
advance notice that their investments will come to an end at a
prespecified time, and that the time between enactment and implementation is intended to smooth the costs of the eventual prohibition. In the language of the Takings Clause, the prospective
grandfathering we propose eases the costs of the legal transition
by leveling it out over a long period.191
.theguardian.com/business/2017/jul/06/france-ban-petrol-diesel-cars-2040
-emmanuel-macron-volvo.
190. See infra Part III.B.3.
191. See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 1, 3 (2003) (“Regulatory takings claims are fundamentally conflicts over legal
transitions.”); Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 216–18 (2003) (arguing for
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Indeed, the complex interaction of discount rates and statutes of limitations may even preclude takings challenges. Delayed implementation of a legal change blunts the economic impact of that change. If the natural gas industry were to challenge
our proposed sunrise rule on the date of enactment, it would almost certainly fail the Penn Central test because the resulting
diminution in value, and the extent of interference with investment-backed expectations, would be discounted to present value.
This is precisely the same reasoning used to uphold amortization
provisions generally. The effect of the new rule thirty years from
now will be small enough to survive Penn Central analysis. 192
Importantly, however, the natural gas industry also would not
be able to wait until the date of implementation to sue because
of statute of limitations problems. The statute of limitations for
takings claims is generally six years from the date the claim accrues. 193 For facial takings claims, and the kind of clear-cut rule
we propose, that accrual date should be the date of enactment
and not the date of implementation.194
transition policies for regulatory takings of private property as a type of “government-provided insurance”); Edan Rotenberg, Ending Both Forms of Grandfathering in Environmental Law, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10717, 10719 (2007) (explaining that grandfathering compensates property owners for legal
transitions).
192. Imagine that the financial impact thirty years from now will be in the
billions of dollars. That loss might not result in a significant diminution in value
today. The discounted present value of a billion dollars thirty years in the future
is approximately $170 million (using a six percent interest rate). Although this
is a lot of money, it represents a small fraction (less than one-fifth) of the eventual loss. The value of the entire natural gas industry that would be affected by
the end of the natural gas bridge, if discounted in this way, would represent a
loss today of less than twenty percent, which should not rise to the level of a
taking under Penn Central.
193. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012). In John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations of any action in the Court
of Claims is jurisdictional; thus, it may not be tolled, and it must be considered
by the court sua sponte. 522 U.S. 130, 134–35 (2008) (citing Finn v. United
States, 123 U.S. 227, 232 (1887)). Due to the fact-sensitive nature of takings
claims, however, courts will dismiss a case based on the statute of limitations
only if more than six years has passed since the taking could not have been in
controversy. Ewald v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 378, 382 (1988).
194. See, e.g., Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 687–88 (9th
Cir. 1993) (finding that a statute’s enactment triggered the statute of limitations); see also Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1, 27 n.112 (1995); cf. Richard A. Epstein, Takings:
Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 28 (“ The taking therefore occurs not at the time of the final judicial determination, but at the earlier moment when the regulation was first placed into effect.”); Gregory M. Stein, Pinpointing the Beginning and Ending of a Temporary Regulatory Taking,
70 WASH. L. REV. 953 (1995) (discussing when statutes of limitations begin to
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In short, where the implementation date is pushed off far
into the future, sunrise lawmaking will not have a significant
enough impact when discounted to present value to violate the
Takings Clause, and by the time it would have such an impact,
the statute of limitations will have run. This outcome is not some
kind of perverse trap for the natural gas industry, but instead
follows naturally from substantive takings law. Where legal
transitions occur over a long enough period of time so that property owners can adjust to legal changes, there should be no takings protection. 195
It is not surprising that the relationship between timing
rules and the Takings Clause has not been explored before. None
of the sunrise provisions we have identified even implicate the
Takings Clause. If the underlying regulation would not create a
takings claim, there is no reason to consider how delaying implementation would change the takings calculus. Moreover, most
sunrise provisions are too short to provide the kind of immunity
that our proposal would create because they do not provide for
adequate amortization. The duration we envision is extremely
unusual. Most implementation dates are measured by months or
maybe years from the adoption of a rule. 196 Ours is measured in
decades.
Nevertheless, there are informative analogies. Our proposal
bears a surprising resemblance to municipal street mapping.
Many municipalities identify the location for future streets well
in advance of building them. In fact, in some instances, streets
are mapped decades before they are actually built—if they are
ever built at all. But the act of mapping the streets is important
because it puts property owners on notice that the streets may
be built, and so can remove the need to pay compensation for any
structures built where a street was already mapped. 197 If and
run).
195. This is contrary to an assumption by Professors Gersen and Posner,
who argued in their theoretical discussion of timing rules for legislation that
delaying implementation of a rule does not constitute compensation. Gersen &
Posner, supra note 169, at 584. In fact, it should. As prospective grandfathering,
if the delay is long enough to constitute adequate amortization, it should prevent the ultimate implementation of a law or regulation from effecting a taking.
196. It is interesting to note that the EPA’s lead phase-down continued for
roughly a decade, and Article I, Section 9 of the U. S. Constitution prohibited
congressional interference with the slave trade for twenty years after ratification. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note 24,
at 2015, 2018–19 (discussing this example as a sunrise provision).
197. See In re Furman St., 17 Wend. 649, 655–56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (finding that the street plan provided notice to residents and landowners were not
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when the municipality actually builds the street, it will have to
pay compensation for the underlying land, but not for improvements on the land.198 Advance notice of the possibility of regulations in the future has a similar effect.
3. Implementing Prospective Grandfathering: Accelerated
Depreciation
In theory, the most straightforward way to implement prospective grandfathering is for Congress to enact a statute that
imposes new regulations on natural gas with an implementation
date three decades from now, coupled with an explicit provision
that the interim period counts as amortization. For instance,
Congress could mandate that EPA adopt regulations to be implemented by some date certain, either specifying the carbon
emission limits itself or, more plausibly, instructing EPA to
adopt significant carbon limits by 2040 or 2050. Unfortunately,
this seems wholly implausible. Congress had shown little willingness to regulate carbon in any meaningful way before the
2016 election, and any hope of near-term congressional action
seems unrealistic.
Only slightly more likely would be for EPA to adopt a sunrise rule prohibiting natural gas in the future under its existing
Clean Air Act authority. Before the 2016 election, the agency
promulgated new source performance standards for fossil-fuelfired power plants, and before the recent EPA regulatory shifts
our approach would simply have required EPA to add the steeper
future emissions reduction requirements to its current regulations. 199 This would raise questions about the authority to do so
under the Clean Air Act, the calculation of costs and benefits under the executive orders on regulatory reviews and other issues,
but these are beyond the scope of this Article. Our point is that
a regulatory option is conceptually a plausible approach to prospective grandfathering.
owed compensation for erecting structures that failed to comply with the public
plan). But see Trent Andrews, Comment, Official Maps and the Regulatory Takings Problem: A Legislative Solution, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2251, 2253–58 (describing unpredictability of cases, and some that found the act of adopting an
official map to be regulatory takings because of the immediate impact of the
map on property values).
198. See In re Furman St., 17 Wend. at 657, 660 (noting that while landowners could be compensated for the reasonable value of their land, they could not
extract exorbitant sums from the public by building extravagant structures).
199. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 80 Fed.
Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) (establishing standards for fossil-fuel-fired units).
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Of course, any near-term EPA carbon regulations became
extremely unlikely following the 2016 presidential election.
Even with the political benefits of our approach—discussed below 200—we do not expect EPA to adopt new regulations of carbon
emissions anytime in the near future. That puts increasing pressure on the states, which do, in fact, have a number of paths for
implementing prospective grandfathering. 201
Most obviously, state utility regulators could introduce the
same kind of sunrise rulemaking that is available to EPA. The
mechanics will vary state by state, and not every agency has an
obvious way to phase out natural gas power plants far in the future. Just as problematically, the politics surrounding state utility regulation may prove difficult to overcome. That political
landscape changes, however, if states can offer the natural gas
industry a short-term or medium-term benefit in exchange for
losing property protection far in the future. Regulators could
therefore also create prospective grandfathering by providing
additional money ex ante as a way of accelerating amortization.
Importantly, this is not the compensation that would be required if the regulation effected a taking. Following the logic of
amortization, it is a kind of ex ante payment that is then included for purposes of assessing diminution in value; it prevents
a future regulation from being a taking at all.202 This reasoning
mirrors the justifications for upholding amortization, and it
should insulate any regulator from future takings liability.
There are also any number of ways of providing an ex ante
payment. Outright tax benefits would be the most straightforward. Indeed, it is arguably the case that the enormous tax benefits currently provided to the natural gas industry—and the energy sector as a whole—should make compensation unnecessary
for any future regulation already.203 Doctrinally, however, courts
have kept takings and taxing in conceptually separate catego-

200. See infra Part III.C.
201. It also puts increasing pressure on private governance, as one of us has
recently been arguing. See generally Vandenbergh, supra note 147 (suggesting
that private governance is an increasingly important component of modern environmental governance).
202. This is the same logic that applies to transferable development rights.
See generally Serkin, supra note 162 (discussing TDRs).
203. See generally Tracey M. Roberts, Picking Winners and Losers: A Structural Examination of Tax Subsidies to the Energy Industry, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63 (2016) (identifying the extent of tax subsidies to fossil fuel companies).
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ries; they are likely to be reluctant to count favorable tax treatment as an offsetting benefit for purposes of takings analysis. 204
Nor are tax credits or other tax benefits conditioned on relinquishing takings claims in the future. The mere fact of favorable
tax treatment should be enough to trigger prospective grandfathering, but doctrinally may not be.
Prospective grandfathering can be triggered in other ways
that are more closely tied to the underlying rationale of amortization and that are therefore more promising. The most intriguing, and therefore the one we explore in depth below, is for
state utility regulators to exercise their ratemaking authority to
trigger prospective grandfathering. This is primarily by way of
example; other approaches would work as well. But ratemaking
is a particularly effective and appropriate approach in this setting.
Ratemaking by utility regulators is a complex topic. The details fill volumes and go far beyond what we can address here. 205
But in broad form, utility regulators set rates by identifying the
total revenue that the utility will require and spreading that revenue over the customer base.206 The total revenue required will
include the marginal cost of the power itself, as well as a reasonable rate of return on the costs of capital improvements, like the
development of infrastructure or a new plant. Capital costs can
be included in the base rate for customers, and will be spread out
over the projected useful life of the capital asset. 207 So, for example, the marginal cost (that is, the production cost) of each kWh
204. Cf. generally Peñalver, supra note 72 (discussing relationship between
taxes and the Takings Clause).
205. See, e.g., Jeremy Knee, Rational Electricity Regulation: Environmental
Impacts and the “Public Interest”, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 739, 747–51 (2011) (detailing the history of ratemaking); Ari Peskoe, Unjust, Unreasonable, and Unduly
Discriminatory: Electric Utility Rates and the Campaign Against Rooftop Solar,
11 TEX. J. OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 211, 263–74 (2016) (summarizing recent ratemaking proceedings concerning ratemaking subsidies); Jim Rossi, The Political
Economy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TUL.
L. REV. 379, 390–93 (2009) (exploring the ratemaking process).
206. See, e.g., Lino Mendiola, The Erosion of Traditional Ratemaking
Through the Use of Special Rates, Riders, and Other Mechanisms, 10 TEX. TECH
ADMIN. L.J. 173, 173 (2008) (“In a traditional model of ratemaking, regulators
establish rates after a review and approval of the utility’s total revenue requirement measured during a historical ‘test year.’”).
207. See, e.g., MARK COOPER, ADVANCED COST RECOVERY FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS: A BAD IDEA THAT GETS WORSE BY THE MINUTE 3–4 (2011), http://www
.iaumc.org/files/fileslibrary/2011NuclearPower-CooperIssueBrief.pdf (describing how capital investments must be “used and useful” and “just, reasonable,
and prudent” before they can be passed on to customers).
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of electricity may be $0.05, but the actual “levelized” cost to consumers might be $0.10 per kWh, to incorporate cost recovery for
the fixed capital investments.208 The depreciation rates for capital assets will determine how they are built into the base rate,
and this can be an important policy lever. By accelerating depreciation rates, rate-makers can, in effect, expedite cost recovery,
and so allow utilities to amortize their investments more
quickly.
To be explicit, we propose that state regulators allow natural gas utilities to recover their investments from consumers
more quickly in exchange for losing the right to sue for a regulatory taking in the future.209 An aggressive form of cost recovery
is currently being used—controversially, it is true—to stimulate
investments in nuclear power. No new nuclear power plants
have been built in this country for over thirty years. The reason
is as much financial as it is technological. New plants take a long
time to build, often struggle to meet regulatory requirements,
and are beset by cost overruns. The problem for a public utility,
then, is that the substantial costs of developing a nuclear power
plant are not typically passed on to consumers until the plant
actually comes online. 210 As a result, some utility regulators
have adopted accelerated cost recovery, allowing the costs of nuclear plants to be built into base rate before the plant actually
starts producing power. 211 The effect is to lower the financial
risks for the utility, to provide access to less expensive financing
mechanisms, and thereby to incentivize the construction of new
plants. The strategy is controversial because it increases costs to
consumers in the short run, and it folds in costs of nuclear facilities that may not actually benefit consumers for decades, if
ever. 212
208. See, e.g., Electric Generating Costs: A Primer, INST. FOR ENERGY RES.
(Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/electric
-generating-costs-a-primer.
209. In effect, this addresses the more familiar problem of stranded costs
from a different temporal perspective, ex ante instead of ex post. See Hammond
& Rossi, supra note 23, at 652–55 (noting the importance of cost recovery).
210. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 207, at 3–4 (explaining the relationship
between ratemaking and cost recovery).
211. See 26 U.S.C. § 168 (2012) (providing for accelerated cost recovery);
26 C.F.R. 1.168(a)-1 (2017) (providing for modified accelerated cost recovery);
THE CSIS COMM’N ON NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY IN THE U.S., RESTORING U.S.
LEADERSHIP IN NUCLEAR ENERGY: A NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVE 37
(2013) (noting that nuclear power is typically eligible for fifteen-year cost recovery).
212. See Sony Ben-Moshe et al., Financing the Nuclear Renaissance: The
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The accelerated depreciation we propose for natural gas
avoids some of the pitfalls of accelerated cost recovery for nuclear
plants by ensuring that natural gas facilities are actually online
and producing power before being added to base rate. Accelerated depreciation will still force consumers to bear some or, potentially, all of the risk of regulatory change by paying for the
costs of natural gas infrastructure early. If our predictions are
correct, they will be buying facilities with shortened lifespans resulting from regulatory, rather than physical, limits. But to the
extent we are right, this accelerated repayment also reflects reality and provides a more realistic price signal about the true
cost of power generation. In other words, consumers should pay
for this risk because it provides a more accurate pricing mechanism for the true cost of natural gas. In effect, it forces consumers to internalize at least some of the intertemporal costs of energy consumption today.
This approach might also blunt utilities’ opposition to our
sunrise proposals and might indeed make them supporters. For
a utility, the ability to recover capital expenditures on an accelerated basis is a substantial economic benefit. More importantly,
it is a benefit in the short term in exchange for eliminating takings protection in the long term. While pricing and individual
risk preferences matter, we expect that this is an exchange
many, if not most, utilities would willingly undertake. In other
words, this is a better outcome than the do-nothing path we are
currently on. Utilities know there is a chance that natural gas
will be subject to significant new carbon regulations in the future
and that the Takings Clause may not provide them with compensation. Our proposal for accelerated cost recovery coupled
with prospective grandfathering gives utilities a meaningful economic benefit and it may even increase the competitive advantage of natural gas over coal.
Some may object that this proposal amounts to paying off
the natural gas industry when no payment should be necessary.
Not only is it normatively problematic to transfer money to an
industry creating a significant public harm, it also amounts to
an implicit concession that compensation may be required for the
Benefits and Potential Pitfalls of Federal & State Government Subsidies and the
Future of Nuclear Power in California, 30 ENERGY L.J. 497, 502 (2009) (noting
that cost recovery for nuclear power is often structured without regard to budget
overruns or commercial viability); William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of
Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA
L. REV. 810, 849 (2016) (citing disputes over cost recovery for facilities that
would never be useful).
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eventual regulation of natural gas and for the regulation of fossil
fuels more broadly. Both are serious objections. But the accelerated cost recovery we envision should be viewed as an inducement to develop energy infrastructure in the face of a shorterthan-normal lifespan. It is not compensation for the eventual
regulation, so much as it is creating incentives for the development of natural gas despite its inevitable regulation. What we
offer is a form of implicit compensation that prevents the eventual regulation of natural gas from being a taking in the first
place.
We must also acknowledge that nothing in this proposal will
prevent owners of natural gas infrastructure from suing in the
future, regardless of the ex ante payoff. They can take the money
from accelerated depreciation and then sue under the Takings
Clause when the government eventually regulates. There is, of
course, no way to prevent someone from suing in the future;
courts remain accessible for adjudicating constitutional claims.
Nevertheless, the logic of prospective grandfathering and ex ante
amortization will make takings claims even more difficult to win
than they already are. And perhaps even more importantly, our
proposal should shift the politics of such regulatory takings
claims. State officials should not fear losing either in courts of
law or in courts of public opinion when the natural gas industry
is understood to have benefitted in clear and quantifiable ways
leading up to the regulation.
More creative approaches could change those dynamics further. For example, instead of allowing utilities to capture the
benefits of accelerated depreciation immediately, those extra
funds could, in effect, be escrowed for the life of natural gas, to
be paid only when natural gas is, in fact, eliminated. Utilities in
the future would then have a more complicated decision about
whether to challenge the inevitable regulation. The money set
aside would amount to a kind of payment in the future if and
when utilities acquiesced to the new regulatory regime. This
could be combined with limits on legal challenges, more-or-less
complicated payout triggers and schedules, and so forth. We are
confident that many different structures would accomplish our
overall goals, but we reserve those details for future work. One
advantage of implementing prospective grandfathering through
state utility regulators is the opportunity to experiment with a
number of different approaches.
Focusing on state regulators to trigger prospective grandfathering has another obvious disadvantage, however. It will allow
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for prospective grandfathering only in those states that actually
adopt our proposal, and in which amortization is allowed. Takings claims will remain as viable as before in states that do not
allow accelerated depreciation. Nevertheless, this is still an improvement over the status quo. And to the extent that the natural gas infrastructure relies on network effects, anticipating the
loss of pipelines, wells, and even power plants in some states
may be enough to alter the reasonable expectations of the industry as a whole.
Other policy levers could have the same effect as accelerated
cost recovery through state utility regulators. For instance, the
IRS could offer accelerated depreciation for tax purposes. This
would, in effect, allow the natural gas industry to deduct a
greater portion of its capital costs in its federal tax returns.
Other approaches could include state or federal tax credits, or
other forms of more explicit payment. We are agnostic, but we
suspect that our proposal for intervention by state utility regulators is both the most likely politically, and the most effective.
We consider the politics of our proposal next.
C. IN DEFENSE OF PROSPECTIVE GRANDFATHERING
Stepping back from the details of accelerated cost recovery
by state regulators, our proposal to sunrise new regulation promises some important benefits that go beyond just natural gas. For
one, opposition may be less intense because the expected cost of
the regulation is relatively small today. By delaying the effect of
new regulations far into the future, the discounted present value
of the regulatory burdens will be relatively small. Indeed, that is
the doctrinal justification for our approach.
In the context of natural gas, this means specifically that
industry has less reason to fight the sunrise provision today. 213
Industry will have plenty of opportunity to lobby against any
eventual regulations in subsequent decades, and so the costs of
this early authorization are perhaps too abstract to generate intense political opposition. Moreover, the law can be viewed as a
kind of safety valve or insurance policy in case the dire predictions of global climate change come true. The kind of deferred
regulatory authorization that a sunrise provision reflects may

213. Cf. Gersen & Posner, supra note 169, at 570–71 (“[R]ules that require
delay between when a problem is identified and when legislation may be enacted will weaken the relative power of interest groups, and thus increase the
probability that public-spirited legislation will be enacted.”).
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actually thread the increasingly thin needle of political feasibility and meaningful impact. The costs today are modest, but by
preventing future regulatory takings claims, it preserves greater
flexibility for regulators in the future faced with the need to eliminate natural gas from our energy infrastructure.
More subtly, pushing implementation far into the future
may also cause decision-makers today to be more other-regarding. In the context of constitutional changes, Professor Amar observed: “Once Americans understand that . . . they are setting
up fair procedures not so much for themselves as for their unborn grandchildren and great-grandchildren, they should be
more likely to focus on what is truly right rather that what is in
their own current interest.” 214 The same logic applies to our proposal, and so promises a way through some legislative logjams.
Pushing the implementation date of carbon regulations far
enough into the future allows for an exclusively future-oriented
rule. And, of course, if the world turns out differently than current policy makers predict, they can always change the rule
later.
This last point is important both legally and conceptually.
One objection to the kind of sunrise rule we propose—especially
with the long duration necessary for natural gas—is the problem
of dead hand control. One Congress or agency cannot make policy binding on future generations. 215 Lawmakers must respond
to the policy preferences of their own constituents and are not
beholden to the past. A long sunrise provision may appear to be
an attempt to force contemporary policy preferences on to the
future. But we are, in fact, arguing for just the opposite. Our focus is on preserving policy flexibility into the future, by ensuring
that property rights are not allowed to constrain foreseeable regulatory initiatives. And of course, there is nothing binding about
a sunrise rule. Its strength lies in its inertia. If future generations want to change course, there is nothing to prevent them
from doing so. If the scientific consensus on climate change turns
out to be wrong or the balance of costs and benefits shifts in a
different direction than now seems likely, future policymakers
will not be prevented from allowing the continued use of natural
214. AMAR, supra note 24, at 475; see also Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note
24, at 1980 (arguing that sunrise lawmaking “can be used to enlarge the sphere
of democratic participation when short-term vested interests might otherwise
stand in the way”).
215. See Serkin, supra note 25, at 881 (“In a democracy, governments are
not allowed to bind future governments.”).
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gas plants. But they will have the flexibility to act.
This observation does not undermine the value of sunrise
rules because their inertial force may be considerable. Moreover,
adopting the rule today will—as we argue—defang one of the objections that future generations might have to adopting a rule
themselves: that it interferes too much with settled expectations.
Compared to enacting a ban or significant regulation of carbon
today, the approach we propose is indeed weak tea. But as compared to doing nothing today, our proposal may meaningfully
change both the political and legal landscape decades from now
when the nation will need to wean itself off of natural gas.
CONCLUSION
Natural gas poses a particular challenge to policymakers today. Rapid and widespread proliferation of natural gas is essential if we are to make major progress in reducing carbon emissions. However, we will eventually have to wean ourselves off of
natural gas, too, and so we can anticipate strict new emissions
rules applying to natural gas several decades from now. When
that happens, investors and owners of the natural gas infrastructure are almost certain to object and claim that the inevitable regulations are unconstitutional takings of their property.
Fortunately, there are tools available to us today that will help
to defang those takings claims in both public debates and legal
actions. For one, developing a clear and widely disseminated record detailing the likely future constraints on natural-gas-fired
power plants will help to limit reasonable investment-backed expectations of the natural gas industry. More provocatively, too,
adopting rules with long sunrise periods should count as a kind
of prospective grandfathering that allows the natural gas industry to amortize its investments. This, in turn, will forestall takings claims, allowing even regulations that eliminate existing
uses of property without explicit monetary compensation.
Prospective grandfathering through sunrise rulemaking
may prove useful beyond the context of natural gas. It is a particularly powerful tool for easing transition costs, and may cut
through some of the political opposition that faster changes often
generate. In a world with seemingly hopeless legislative gridlock, deploying these kinds of creative timing rules may provide
some modest opportunity to pursue meaningful changes in the
law.

